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The defences of negligent navigation; fire and heavy weather as a peril of the seas 
will be examined in this study as they have been identified as the most controversial 
and litigated defences contained in the Hague-Visby Rules. Articles III and IV of the 
Hague-Visby Rules which are the relevant provisions pertaining to the defences will 
be critically analysed in the study.  Case law of the jurisdictions of the United States 
of America, the United Kingdom, Australia and South Africa pertaining to the 
defences will be examined in order to critically analyse and evaluate the defences.    
The aim of this study is to examine how these defences are interpreted and applied 
in different jurisdictions in order to draw conclusions on their relevance and whether 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The carrier’s obligation to exercise due diligence in making a vessel cargo and 
seaworthy has been a source of great debate in the field of carriage of goods by sea. 
Articles III and IV of the Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading (hereinafter referred to 
as ‘The Hague-Visby Rules’),1 has adapted this common law implied obligation into 
an express obligation on the carrier to exercise due diligence in making the vessel 
cargo and seaworthy. 
Under the Hague-Visby Rules, the carrier in a cargo claim has to prove that it 
exercised due diligence in all material respects pertaining to the vessel. If the carrier 
is unable to prove such due diligence, it at the very least must prove that its failure to 
exercise due diligence was not the cause of the loss or damage to the cargo. If the 
carrier can prove that the loss arose due to factors other than its lack of due 
diligence, further defences will remain open to the carrier.2 
Article IV Rule 2 of The Hague-Visby Rules contains a list of sixteen defences that a 
carrier may rely upon in order to avoid liability in a cargo claim. This study will 
however only focus on the below listed three defences, as these are considered to 
be the most controversial and have been the subject matter of much litigation since 
the Rules first came into operation. As per Article IV Rule 2 of The Hague-Visby 
Rules, 
‘Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage 
arising or resulting from- 
(a) Act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot or the servants of the 
carrier in the navigation or in the management of the ship; 
(b) Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier; 
(c) Perils, dangers and accidents of the sea or other navigable waters;’ 
 
1 In 1969 certain amendments were made to the Hague Rules by the ‘Brussels Protocol’ with the new amended 
rules being known as the Hague-Visby Rules. 





These are amongst the most common defences that arise in cargo claims globally, 
but their application across different jurisdictions is what makes them controversial in 
nature. 
Different jurisdictions take different approaches to the application of these defences 
in cargo claims. Hence, it is of importance to study these three defences in detail and 
to examine judgments in order to gain insight into the different approaches in the 
interpretation and application of these defences and the basis for such differences. 
As the facts of each case are different, it is interesting to examine how these 
defences are applied in cases where the facts are complex and unique. 
1.2 Aim of the Thesis  
As highlighted above, the aim of this thesis is to critically analyse and examine the 
three most litigated and controversial defences of The Hague-Visby Rules, namely; 
the defence of negligent navigation, the defence of fire and the defence of perils, 
dangers and accidents of the sea, commonly referred to as the ‘heavy weather 
defence’.  
These defences contained in the Hague-Visby Rules can only be relied on by a 
carrier if it has exercised due diligence in making the vessel cargo and seaworthy 
prior to the voyage. Examining the standard of this obligation on the carrier and how 
it is interpreted in different jurisdictions is of importance in gaining insight into the 
reasons behind the varied application and interpretations of these defences in 
different jurisdictions and the legal and commercial implications for carriers, shippers 
and insurers in the maritime industry.  
Many Commonwealth nations e.g. South Africa and Australia follow the English 
approach when adjudicating maritime claims in which these defences have been 
invoked. However, the United States of America, a major maritime trading nation, is 
known to deviate from the English approach. It is submitted that studies such as this 
one, examining the jurisdictional differences in the application of these defences and 
ascertaining the merits and flaws of each approach in order to make 
recommendations for the much needed modernising and updating of current carriage 
liability regimes, will ultimately lead to legal certainty and harmonisation of the laws 
governing the international carriage of goods by sea. 
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1.3 Statement of Purpose 
The three maritime defences that form the subject matter of this study are 
considered controversial for inter alia the following reasons: 
• They are contained in the Hague-Visby Rules that came into operation many 
decades ago, which in turn was heavily influenced by the Harter Act3 that is 
more than a century old 
• These defences do not take into account modern technological and 
navigational advancements. They are antiquated and do not cater for modern 
maritime trade to the detriment of cargo-owners. 
• They are thought to be unfairly advantageous to the carrier in a cargo claim. 
This study therefore looks at how these defences are interpreted and applied in 
different jurisdictions in order to draw conclusions on the relevance of these 
defences and whether they still have a place in modern maritime trade. It will also 
attempt to make practical recommendations on how to update this area of carriage of 
goods by sea. 
1.4 Outline of the Research Questions 
The key questions when examining the three most controversial and heavily litigated 
defences that a carrier may rely upon in a cargo claim: 
• Where does the carrier’s obligation to provide a cargo and seaworthy vessel 
for the carriage of goods by sea stem from and how did it evolve to its present 
form? 
• Were there any exceptions to the carrier’s obligation historically and are any 
of these exceptions still relevant? 
• What are the conditions attached to the carrier relying on these three 
defences? 
• Who bears the onus of proof and the order it follows in each stage of a cargo 
claim where the carrier is disputing liability? 
• How do the courts approach these three defences in the jurisdictions of the 
United States of America, Australia, the United Kingdom and South Africa? 
 
3 The Harter Act of 1893. 
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• Have the Hague-Visby Rules created uniformity and harmonisation in the 
application of its provisions relating to the three defences? 
• Are the Hague-Visby Rules an effective and modern carriage of goods by sea 
regime for modernised maritime transportation? 
In order to analyse the three defences and to address the research questions 
based on the defences, court decisions from the above mentioned four 
jurisdictions will be extensively examined. 
1.5 Scope and Limitations of the Thesis 
As mentioned, the main objective of this study is to examine the jurisdictional 
differences in the interpretation and application of the three most controversial and 
heavily litigated defences available to a carrier in cargo claims.  In order to achieve 
this objective, the study will briefly trace the historical development of the carrier’s 
obligation to provide a cargo and seaworthy vessel and any exceptions available to a 
carrier in this regard, by examining the common law position and how it has evolved 
under various carriage regimes. 
A comprehensive discussion on all the maritime defences listed under the Hague-
Visby Rules is beyond the scope of this study.  As mentioned, this study will focus on 
the negligent navigation defence, the fire defence and the 'heavy weather defence' 
as provided for under the Hague-Visby Rules. These three defences are identified 
above as the most controversial and heavily litigated upon defences available to a 
carrier. Relevant sections of Articles III and IV of the Hague-Visby Rules pertaining 
to these defences will therefore be examined in this study.    
Each defence will be comprehensively dealt with in separate chapters. This study will 
also examine the carrier’s obligation to exercise due diligence, focussing on the 
standard of this obligation and how the various jurisdictions interpret it in respect of 
the above three defences. A brief outline of the burden and order of proof in a cargo 
claim will also be discussed. 
In respect of the controversial negligent navigational defence, an overview of the 
attempt to get rid of this defence in the United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
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the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (hereinafter referred to 
as the ‘Rotterdam Rules’)4 will be included in this study. 
Only judgements pertaining to the relevant maritime defences from the jurisdictions 
of the United States of America, Australia, the United Kingdom and South Africa will 
be examined in this study.  
The one limitation of this study, is the fact that there is very limited reported case law 
in South Africa, in which the three defences have been interpreted and applied. This 
limitation negatively impacts this study, as no conclusions can be drawn as to the 
effective application of the defences in South African maritime law.  
1.6 Research Methodology 
This is a desktop-based doctrinal research study. The research methodology 
encompasses an analysis of relevant provisions international conventions and 
treaties; and a comparative study of foreign and domestic legislation and case law; 
and scholarly writings. These sources have been utilised in order to examine the 
judicial interpretation and application of the three defences under the Hague-Visby 
Rules in different jurisdictions. Some of the notable South African and international 
scholarly workks examined in this study include those of John Hare, William Tetley, 
John Wilson and Richard Aitkens.  
1.7 Chapter Overview 
Chapter 1: Introduction, outlines the objectives, relevance, research questions and 
scope of study. It further provides a brief chapter by chapter overview of the study. 
Chapter 2: The Historical Development of the Common Law Defences Available to 
an Ocean Carrier in respect of Cargo Claims, briefly traces the origins of the carrier’s 
obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel and the various common law defences that 
were available to the carrier throughout the history of seafaring.  It examines the 
evolution of this obligation under early Roman and English law and the implied 
obligation of the carrier under the American Harter Act. This chapter also looks at the 
development of The Hague-Visby Rules, ending with a brief comparison of its 
relevant provisions with that of the Hamburg and the Rotterdam Rules. 
 
4 The Rules were signed in the port city of Rotterdam in 2009. 
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Chapter 3: The Essential Averments of the Claims and Defences under Article III and 
IV of The Hague-Visby Rules, is a brief outline of the burden and order of proof that 
is followed in a cargo claim.   
Chapter 4: The Defence of Negligent Navigation, this chapter examines the defence 
provided under Article IV Rule 2(a) of The Hague-Visby Rules. This defence 
exempts a carrier from liability if a cargo claim resulted from any act or neglect 
committed by a servant of the carrier in the navigation or management of the vessel. 
This chapter will examine both the aspects of this defence pertaining to errors in the 
navigation of the vessel as well as errors in the management of the vessel. 
Chapter 5: The Defence of Fire, this chapter examines the defence as listed in 
Article IV Rule 2(b) of The Hague-Visby Rules, which states that the carrier is 
excluded from responsibility for loss or damage resulting from ‘fire, unless caused by 
the actual fault or privity of the carrier.’ This defence is contentious among carriers 
due to the additional burden it places on carriers to prove the lack of actual fault or 
privity.5 
Chapter 6: The Defence of Heavy Weather as a Peril of the Seas, is an examination 
of defence as listed in Article IV Rule 2(c) of The Hague-Visby Rules. This chapter 
shall also include an analysis of the different approaches taken in the jurisdictions of 
the United States of America, Australia, the United Kingdom and South Africa by a 
study of the case law of these jurisdictions. 
Chapter 7: Conclusion, this thesis will conclude by evaluating the pertinent defences 
of Article IV Rule 2 of The Hague-Visby Rules, as studied in the preceding chapters 





5 Hare op cit note 2 at 80. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON  LAW 
DEFENCES AVAILBLE TO AN OCEAN CARRIER IN RESPECT OF  CARGO 
CLAIMS 
2.1  Introduction 
In this chapter, the author traces the historical development of the common law 
defenses that were available to the carrier prior to the 19th century under Roman law 
and later English law. These common law defenses have been codified and adopted 
by various jurisdictions through the enactment of international conventions and 
legislation. The first country to enact legislation pertaining to the defenses available 
to a carrier was the United States of America namely, its enactment of the Harter Act 
of 1892. This was then followed by the International Convention for the Unification of 
Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading (hereinafter referred to as ‘The 
Hague Rules’) in 1924, which was then amended in 1968 and known as the Hague-
Visby Rules. The Hamburg Rules followed suit in 1978. The latest international 
Convention that attempts to regulate the carrier’s defenses is the Rotterdam Rules. 
These four international Conventions will be explored further below. 
As mentioned, the United States (hereinafter referred to as the ‘US’) was the first 
country to create legislation that developed the common law rights and liabilities of 
the parties to contract of the carriage of good by sea. This was as a result of the 
international outcry against the forceful strong-hold of powerful British ship-owners, 
who dominated the maritime trade industry. The Harter Act proved to be a success in 
the US, and its success inspired the creation of international Conventions, namely, 
the Hague Rules and the Hague-Visby Rules. 
The Hague Rules and Hague-Visby Rules have proved to be extremely popular and 
most maritime trading nations of the world have adopted some version of the Rules. 
However, these Rules are now many decades old and have not kept up with the 
modern advancements in maritime trade. In an effort to update the carriage of goods 
regimes in line with the advancements experienced within the global maritime trade 
industry, two international conventions have been enacted, namely the Hamburg 
Rules and the Rotterdam Rules. The creation of both these Conventions were 
attempts at modernising carriage regimes on an international scale and leveling the 
playing field between the parties involved in a carriage contract. 
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It is important to explore the background and development of the four international 
Conventions listed above; as they have all contain provisions relating to the 
defenses available to a carrier in a sea carriage contract. 
2.2 Common law defenses available to the carrier pr ior to the 19 th Century 
International trade has dramatically increased over the past centuries and the use of 
sea carriage can be noted as the preferred mode of trade transportation used from 
early times till present. As such, the contractual relationship between the carrier and 
the shipper is central to maritime trade. An examination of the carrier’s liability and 
the defenses available to it in the event of a cargo claim is of significance in this 
regard. This study will attempt to trace the early origins of the common law defenses 
that were available to the carrier, in order to gain insight into the application and 
development of these maritime defenses as they are currently interpreted and 
applied through the provisions of the various carriage liability regimes. 
2.2.1 Early Roman Law 
In early Roman law, the onus of proof for the loss or damage of cargo in a cargo 
claim lay with the cargo owner.6The cargo owner would have to prove fault or dolus 
on the part of the carrier, this would be near impossible as there were little to no 
records that would have been kept by either party to the claim.7 The cargo owner’s 
burdensome onus of proof was somewhat eased by the enactment of the Praetor’s 
Edict, 8  which brought the carrier’s liability in line with the ordinary principles of 
contract that were applicable at that time. 9  The Praetor’s Edict provided that 
‘nautacaupones et stabularii’ (sea carriers, innkeepers and stable keepers) would be 
held liable ‘if they fail to restore to any person any property of which they have 
undertaken the safe-keeping.’10 
This strict liability to provide a seaworthy vessel, imposed on the carrier under 
Roman law through the enforcement of the Praetor’s Edict, was somewhat eased 
 
6 Hare op cit note 2 at 618. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Under Roman law an individual was appointed as a praetor (magistrate) and had the capacity to make laws 
that governed the city of Rome. The Praetor’s Edict was the declaration of legal principles to be administered. 
F Du Bois Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9 ed (2007) 968.  
9 Hare op cite note 2 at 619. 
10 Anderson Shipping (Pty) Ltd 1995 (3) SA 42 (A) at 46. 
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with the introduction of the below exclusions that the carrier could rely upon in a 
cargo claim: 
I. Vis Maior- an act of God, or 
II. Damnum Fatale- an unavoidable, accidental circumstance, such as ship 
wreck, piracy.11 
2.2.2 English Common Law 
The English Court of Admiralty was highly influenced by the Roman principles of 
maritime law, thus incorporating the Roman law model of strict liability of the carrier. 
The concept of strict liability was enacted under the law of bailment in England.12 
Under bailment, the bailee’s was subject to strict liability, which was based upon 
possessory remedies granted to the bailee. The bailee could claim from third parties 
in any event, regardless of negligence and thus the bailee remained strictly liable for 
the lost goods of the bailor.13 
Under English law, the liability of the carrier was that of strict liability with a few 
exceptions. The list below sets out the six original common law exceptions 
developed through English law. These exceptions are widely accepted by most of 
the major maritime trading nations including South Africa, as a result of the British 
colonisation of these nations. The carrier could only rely on these exceptions if it 
could prove that it had taken reasonable steps to avoid damage or loss to the goods 
and to mitigate further damage. 
The six common law exceptions available to the carrier that were developed under 
English law, are: 
• Acts of God (vis maior); 
• Inevitable Accidents (damnun fatale); 
• Inherent vice of the cargo; 
• Latent defect of the cargo; 
• Defective packaging of the cargo; and 
 
11 Hare op cit n 2 at 619. 
12 Bailment refers to the transfer of possession of goods from the bailor to the bailee, until the goods are to be 
returned or depending on what was agreed upon by both parties. 
13 VH Chacon The Due Diligence in Maritime Transportation in the Technological Era (published LLD thesis, 
University of Hamburg, 2016) 42.  
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• Queen’s enemies.14 
The application of the rule of strict liability of the carrier was consistent in English law 
until the end of the 18th century. The new century brought about many changes for 
the maritime industry in England. England began flourishing as a major maritime 
trading nation and English ship-owners dominated the maritime trade markets. This 
was as a result of the rise of liberalism in England and the economic boom of the 
Second Industrial Revolution.15 
English ship-owners increasingly relied on the English contractual principle of party 
autonomy to limit the burdensome common law standard of strict liability.16 They 
conceived more and more elaborate liability exception clauses in the bills of lading, 
even excluding liability for damages resulting from negligence. 
Such exception clauses had the effect of freeing the carrier of any liability for loss or 
damage to the cargo they carried and placed the cargo-owner in a difficult position. 
This inequality of power led to much dissatisfaction among cargo-owners and a 
disregard for maintaining standards of seaworthiness and cargo care by ship-
owners.17 
2.3 International Conventions Pertaining to the Car rier’s Exceptions 
As maritime trade continued to flourish globally, cargo owners began to voice their 
displeasure at the unfavourable position that they were placed in. The dominant 
stance of the English ship-owners over cargo owners from other maritime nations 
began to cause conflict in the international trade markets. There was consensus 
among the maritime trading nations that compromises achieving a more equitable 
balance between the interests of cargo-owners and ship-owners had to be achieved. 
There was also international consensus that the best way to achieve this would be 
through the effective regulation and harmonisation of the laws regulating the 




14 Hare op cit note 2 at 620.  
15 Chacon op cit note 13 at 52. 
16 Ibid 53. 
17 Ibid 56. 
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2.3.1 The Liverpool Conference of 1882 
The first international attempt at achieving uniformity in the rules governing the 
carriage of goods by sea was initiated by the International Law Association,18 in 
1882, at a conference in Liverpool.19 
At the conference a draft model bill of lading was put forward for approval, this was 
known as the ‘conference form’. The main focus of the conference form was to limit 
the number of exception clauses that the carrier could insert into a bill of lading to 
escape liability for the loss or damage of cargo.20 Giermann explains that there were 
two main principles that were introduced in the ‘conference form’. The first being the 
introduction of liability of the carrier for negligence ‘in all matters relating to the 
ordinary course of the voyage.’ The second being the introduction of standard of ‘due 
diligence’ to be exercised by the carrier in making the vessel seaworthy.21 However, 
the ‘conference form’ did not gain the international acceptance that was hoped for 
and was eventually abandoned by the International Law Association.  
2.3.2 The Hamburg Rules of Affreightment 
In a conference held in Hamburg in 1885, the International Law Association 
developed a set of rules, known as the ‘Hamburg Rules of Affreightment’.22 The main 
areas of focus of the Rules were how to deal with the responsibilities of the carrier in 
instances of negligence and the provisions ensuring that any clauses inserted by the 
carrier with the intention of lessening its liability, would be deemed unlawful. 23 
However, like their predecessor, the Liverpool ‘conference form’, these Rules were 
met with an underwhelming response from the international community and were 
eventually abandoned. 
2.3.3 The Implied Obligation under the Harter Act 
As previously discussed, even towards the end of the 19th century, English ship-
owners maintained their dominance in the international shipping industry. Through 
 
18 The Association for the Reform and Codification of the laws of Nations was formed in 1873, and in 1895 
changed its name to the International Law Association.  
19 HA Giermann The Evidentiary Value of Bills of Lading and Estoppel (2004) 28. 
20 Ibid 29. 
21 Ibid 29. 




their monopolistic dominance, English carriers were able to avoid liability by inserting 
exception clauses, as well as choice of law and forum clauses ensuring that 
contractual disputes were resolved under English law in English forums.24  Hare 
notes that the carrier’s dominance was not as guaranteed in the US as it was in 
England. Courts in the US enforced the doctrine of public policy, finding clauses that 
sought to unfairly limit the carrier’s liability as unlawful.25 In the Liverpool case for 
example, 26  a clause in the bill of lading excluding the carrier from liability for 
negligence caused by the crew of the vessel was held to be invalid. These differing 
views caused divergence in the application of the liability of the carrier. English 
courts allowed carriers to avoid all liability, while American courts applied the 
doctrine of strict liability and rejected the attempts of British ship-owners to evade 
liability in cargo claims.27 The US Harter Act of 1893, thus emerged in response to 
the unsatisfactory position of ship-owner dominance of the shipping industry to the 
detriment of cargo-owners.28 
Section 192 of the Harter Act states,  
‘If the owner of any vessel transporting merchandise or property to or from 
any port in the United States of America shall exercise due diligence to make 
the said vessel in all respects seaworthy and properly manned, equipped and 
supplied, neither the vessel, her owner or owners, agents or charterers, shall 
become or be held responsible for damage or loss resulting from faults or 
errors in navigation or the management of the said vessel nor shall the vessel, 
her owner or owners, charterers, agent or master be held liable for losses 
arising from dangers of the sea, or other navigable waters, acts of God or 
public enemies or the inherent defect, quality, or vice of the thing carried, or 
from insufficiency of package, or seizure under legal process, or for the loss 
resulting from any act or omission of the shipper or the owner of the goods, 
 
24 Y Yang The Abolition of the Nautical Fault Exception: To be or not to be (published LLM thesis, Lund 
University, 2011) 12.  
25 Hare op cit note 2 at 622. 
26Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v Phenix Insurance Co. 129 U.S. 397 (1889). 




his agent or representative, or from saving or attempting to save life or 
property at sea, or from any deviation in rendering such service.’29 
The Harter Act was instrumental in watering down the absolute obligation of the 
carrier under common law and instead, introducing the notion of due diligence as a 
minimum standard of the obligation of the carrier to provide a seaworthy vessel.30 
Drafters of the Harter Act were tasked with balancing the interests of both the carrier 
and the cargo-owner. The Harter Act was deemed to be a success in the 
development of carriage liability regimes. It placed a minimum standard of liability on 
the carrier that it could not contract out of, while softening the carrier’s absolute 
obligation of seaworthiness to that of a minimum standard of due diligence and still 
embodied the common law exceptions under Roman law that a carrier could rely on, 
provided it had exercised due diligence in making the vessel seaworthy.31 
Among the list of exceptions contained in the Harter Act, it introduced the ‘nautical 
fault’ exception also known as the defense of ‘negligent navigation’ or ‘error in 
navigation or management of the vessel’. The carrier could rely on this exception to 
escape liability in a cargo claim, where loss or damage of cargo resulted from faults 
in the navigation or management of the vessel. This exception will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter Four of this study. 
The Harter Act remains in force more than a century after it was first enacted. It has 
greatly influenced the international and domestic legislation regulating the carriage of 
goods by sea. The Harter Act became a prototype for legislation that was enacted by 
Australia, Morocco, and New Zealand, among other maritime nations.32 
2.3.4 The Development of the Hague Rules 
The Harter Act had a profound effect on the regulation and harmonisation of carriage 
of goods by sea. Other maritime nations were quick to employ provisions of the 
Harter Act within their own jurisdictions. At a diplomatic conference in the Hague in 
1921, the Maritime Law Committee of the International Law Association, presented a 
code of rules similar to provisions of the Harter Act that were adopted at the 
 
29 Section 192 of the Harter Act of 1893. 
30 Hare op cit note 2 at 623. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Yang op cit note 24 at 13. 
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conference and became known as ‘The Hague Rules, 1921’.33 The code of rules 
differed slightly from the Harter- style provisions, in that the Rules formed a self- 
contained code that would not need to reference domestic law, and contained 
provisions that created rights and immunities for both the carrier and cargo-
owner.34Although the rules had no binding effect, it was anticipated by the drafters 
that its adoption by maritime trading nations would bring about uniformity in the laws 
governing the carriage of goods by sea.35 Unsurprisingly, carriers were reluctant to 
adopt the Rules and give up their dominant position in maritime trade.  Pressure 
from cargo-owners, resulted in a second conference that was held in Brussels in 
1923.36 
After much deliberation and discussion by the conference in Brussels, the amended 
Hague rules were signed into effect as an international convention on 25 August 
1924.37 The amended rules were officially titled as The International Conventional for 
the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading. It was commonly 
known as ‘The Hague Rules’. The Hague Rules sought to develop a compromise 
between the interests of the carrier and cargo-owner. Article III (1) and Article IV (1) 
of the Hague Rules turned the implied obligation into an express obligation imposed 
on the carrier to exercise due diligence in making the vessel seaworthy. The 
imposition of a minimum standard of liability on the carrier pacified the cargo-owners 
and also had the effect of replacing the carrier's absolute obligation of strict liability 
under common law with the obligation of a minimum standard  of exercising due 
diligence in making a vessel seaworthy 'before and at the beginning of the voyage’.38 
This watered down the carrier’s liability substantially as it was only liable for the 
cargo during certain time frames and not for the entire voyage. In addition to merely 
stating the vessel had to be seaworthy, the Hague Rules also set out the elements of 
seaworthiness in finer detail. The carrier was required ‘to properly man, equip and 
supply the ship’.39 A further obligation to make the vessel cargo-worthy40 was also 
 
33 Hare op cit note 2 at 624. 
34 M F Sturley ‘The History of COGSA and The Hague Rules’ (1991) 22(1) The Journal Of Maritime Law and 
Commerce 20. 
35 Hare op cite note 2 at 624. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Article III (1) of the Hague Rules. 
39 Article III (1) (b) of the Hague Rules. 
40 Article III (1) (c) of the Hague Rules. 
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placed on the carrier. These provisions placated the cargo-owners, whilst reducing 
the common law absolute obligation of the carrier. The carrier also succeeded in 
obtaining additional exceptions in the amended Rules. In addition to the common law 
exceptions, the Hague Rules allowed for the carrier to further escape liability for 
damage or loss arising from acts of war;41 quarantine restrictions;42 riots and civil 
commotions;43 insufficiency or inadequacy of marks;44 and latent defects that are not 
discoverable by due diligence.45 
The Hague Rules were an international success in the harmonisation of the rules 
governing the carriage of goods by sea. Based on the Harter model, it attempted to 
achieve a better balance between the interests of carriers and cargo-owners on a 
global scale. 
2.3.5 The Hague- Visby Rules 
In 1968, the Hague Rules were amended and these amendments were adopted by 
the ‘Brussels Protocol’, with the amended rules becoming known as the ‘Protocol to 
Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law 
Relating to Bills of Lading’, commonly known as the ‘Hague-Visby Rules’. The United 
Kingdom became a signatory to the Hague- Visby Rules and enacted the provisions 
of the Rules into their domestic legislation through the Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as ‘UK COGSA’).46 Despite not having ratified the 
Hague-Visby Rules, South Africa enacted the provisions of the Hague-Visby Rules 
as a Schedule to the South African Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1986 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘SA COGSA’). 47  The Hague-Visby Rules have been 
ratified by a host of developed and developing maritime nations, including England, 
China, France, Italy and Singapore.48 Both the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules have 
 
41 Article IV (2) (e) of the Hague Rules. 
42 Article IV (2) (h) of the Hague Rules. 
43 Article IV (2) (k) of the Hague Rules. 
44 Article IV (2) (o) of the Hague Rules. 
45 Article IV (2) (p) of the Hague Rules. 
46 Hare op cit note 2 at 625. 
47 Hare op cite note 2 at 648. 
48 E van Dijckkaai  Comite Maritime International Yearbook Annuaire 2016 (2017) 381. 
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received wide global acceptance and most maritime trading nations of the world, 
have adopted some version of the Rules into their domestic legislation.49 
The Hague-Visby Rules retained the minimum standard of liability placed on a carrier 
that it has to discharge through exercising due diligence in making a vessel 
seaworthy before and at the commencement of the voyage. The Hague-Visby Rules 
also maintained the list of exceptions available to a carrier as per the Hague Rules. 
Three exceptions from this list will be discussed in the following chapters of this 
study.  
The main criticisms leveled against the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules are that the 
Conventions are considered to be outdated due to the modern advancements 
experienced within the global shipping industry. The Rules do not adequately cater 
for containerisation or multimodalism. 
The Hague-Visby Rules were not universally adopted by some of the major maritime 
trading nations, such as the United States of America and Australia as they do not 
fully address the needs of both parties to a contract for the carriage of goods by sea. 
The Hague-Visby Rules did not cater for the advancing global economy, even at the 
time of its enactment. Developed economies sought to gain a strong-hold over 
developing nations in sea trade and would only ratify a Convention if it catered solely 
to their needs in respect of carriage of goods by sea. 
Most developing economies rely on the importation of consumer goods and are not 
among the major ship-owning nations, thus the carrier remained the dominant party 
with the most negotiating power and the rules are perceived to be ship-owner 
oriented, thereby, negatively impacting on developing nations.50 
The negligent navigation exception is a good example of why the Rules are 
perceived to be too ship-owner oriented to the detriment of the cargo-owner.51 This 
led to cargo-owning nations viewing the Rules with hostility, as the Rules do not 
adequately protect their interests.  
 
49 Yang op cit note 24 at 16. 




Ship-owners are also wary of the effects of applying certain provisions of the Hague-
Visby Rules to their contracts of carriage. This was as a result of the notorious 
decision made by the House of Lords in the The Muncaster Castle case.52 Hare 
discusses this judgment where the House of Lords held that the ship-owners were 
liable for the damage caused to the cargo onboard the vessel through the negligence 
of the fitter appointed by the ship repairers whose services were enlisted by the ship-
owner prior to the voyage. The said fitter failed to correctly re-tighten the nuts of an 
inspection cover after effecting repairs on the vessel. The cargo was water- 
damaged as a result of water entering through the inspection cover that had not 
been correctly reinstalled and therefore, came loose during a period of heavy 
weather. The ship-owners argued that they had exercised due diligence as per the 
provision of the Hague Rules by hiring the services of reputed ship repairers in 
making the vessel seaworthy before the voyage and could not be held liable for the 
repairer’s negligence; however their argument was rejected by the House of Lords 
on the basis that the obligation of the ship-owner was non-delegable.53 Thus, ship-
owners became wary of the Rules, especially regarding interpretations of the Rules, 
on the scope and extent of the carrier's obligation to exercise due diligence in 
ensuring that a vessel is sea and cargo worthy before and at the commencement of 
the voyage. 
The Hamburg Rules and Rotterdam Rules are examples of global attempts to 
modernise the Rules regulating the international carriage of goods by sea and to 
level the playing field by creating a more equitable balance between the interests of 
the cargo owners and ship-owners. 
2.3.6 The Hamburg Rules 
Due to the inadequacy of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules in keeping up with 
technological advancements, it became imperative to bring about uniformity and 
harmonisation in the rules governing the carriage of goods by sea. New measures 
needed to be taken to regulate and balance the powers and responsibilities of both 
contracting parties, in order to modernise the rules regulating maritime trade. 
 
52 Riverstone Meat Company Pty Ltd. v Lancashire Shipping Company Ltd. (The Muncaster Castle) [1961] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 57.  
53 Hare op cite note 2 at 626. 
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The United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods (hereinafter referred to as 
'The ‘Hamburg Rules) were adopted 1978 but only came into effect in 1992.54 Listed 
below are some of the changes contained in the Hamburg Rules pertaining to the 
carrier's obligations that are relevant to this study.  
• The carrier was liable for loss or damage to the cargo for the entire duration 
of the voyage, regardless as to what was stated on the bill of lading;55 
• The nautical fault defense that the carrier could raise under previous carriage 
Conventions was deleted; 
• The defense of fire that was available to the carrier under previous carriage 
Conventions was modified.  Under the Hamburg Rules, the carrier is liable for 
loss or damage to cargo if the cargo- owner can prove that the fire arose as a 
result of  fault or negligence by the carrier or its servants.56 Under the Hague-
Visby Rules, the cargo-owner had to prove actual fault by the carrier, thus if 
the fire arose as a result of fault or negligence by a servant of the carrier, the 
carrier would be exempted from liability.57 Under the Hamburg Rules, the 
cargo-owner merely has to prove fault or negligence, not actual fault, thus 
swinging the pendulum of onus back to the carrier. 
 
Unlike the Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules extend the period for which the 
carrier is liable for loss or damage to the goods for the entire duration of the voyage.  
The Hamburg Rules also provides more extensive coverage for the period of 
responsibility of the carrier to 'cover the period during which the carrier is in charge of 
the goods at the port of loading, during the carriage and at the port of discharge.'58 
Due to the increase in international trade and ports becoming busier, cargo owners 
resort to leaving their goods at the carrier's warehouse until the vessel is ready to be 
loaded. Consignees also have to utilise warehousing for cargo that is to be 
discharged and delivered.59 Hence, the carrier is responsible for the cargo whether it 
 
54 Ibid. 
55 Article IV (1) (2) of the Hamburg Rules. 
56 Article V (4) of the Hamburg Rules. 
57 K G Ainuson The Hamburg Rules: Did It Change the Liability of the Carrier? (published LLM thesis, University 
of Georgia, 2006) 45. 
58 Article V (1) of the Hamburg Rules. 
59 Chacon op cit note 13 at 83. 
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is onboard the vessel or not.60 The provisions for extended period of responsibility of 
the carrier in the Hamburg Rules is more clearly worded than the provision contained 
in the Hague-Visby Rules.61 These changes were introduced in order to benefit the 
cargo-owner. 
The defence of negligent navigation was the subject of much discussion at the 
Hamburg diplomatic conference. Carriers maintained that the defence was an 
important mechanism, as it distributed risk amongst the insurers in serious 
casualties. Carriers also argued that the deletion of the defence would result in 
increased suits against the carrier in the event of serious casualties at sea such as 
collision and fire; this would also result in higher insurance premiums for the 
carrier.62 Cargo owners argued that this defence would give an undue advantage to 
the carrier, as the carrier would be able to escape responsibilities, even when they 
were negligent. The defense was not included in the Rules as cargo-owners 
successfully argued that due to the technological advancements in sea transport, the 
occurrences of real errors in navigation are rare.63 
The Hamburg Rules have only been ratified by a handful of West African and 
European countries that have no major influence on maritime trade.64 The Rules are 
perceived as being cargo- owner oriented to the detriment of ship-owners and have 
been rejected by many of the major maritime trading nations, such as the US and 
China.65 The Hamburg Rules have not been adopted by South Africa and there are 
no likely prospects of this happening in the near future, as many of its major trading 
partners have also chosen not to adopt the Rules.66 
2.3.7 The Rotterdam Rules 
There is an international perception that the provisions of the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules favour ship-owners to the detriment of cargo-owners. The Hague-Visby Rules 
came into operation many decades ago and their provisions were heavily influenced 
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therefore regarded as antiquated considering modern advancements of technology 
and the rapid development of economies over the last five decades.67 As discussed 
earlier in this chapter, the Hamburg Rules have not gained widespread support from 
the major maritime trading nations and are considered a failure in harmonising global 
carriage of goods by sea regimes. In an effort to assuage the failure of the Hamburg 
Rules, the United Nations Commission on the International Trade Law (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘UNCITRAL’) and the Comite Maritime International (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘CMI’) worked together to draft a new international convention that 
would address the shortcomings of the Hague-Visby Rules and the Hamburg 
Rules.68 
On 11 December 2008, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the 
‘United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods 
Wholly or Partly by Sea’ (commonly known as the ‘Rotterdam Rules’ 69 ). 70  The 
Rotterdam Rules introduce two noteworthy changes in the liability of the carrier 
compared to the Hague-Visby Rules. The first being the period of responsibility of 
the carrier is extended over the entire sea voyage; the second change, being the 
exclusion of the defense of negligent navigation. 71  These two changes were 
considered necessary to ensure the wider international acceptance of the Rules.  
Article 12 of the Rotterdam Rules provides that the carrier’s period of responsibility 
begins when the goods are first received for carriage and ends upon the delivery of 
the goods.72 The intention of Article 12, read together with Article 11, is to cater for 
multi-modal transportation. The use of the words ‘place of destination’ instead of 
‘port of destination’ in the text is used to allow for the multimodality in the modern 
carriage of goods.73 
 
67 Yang op cit note 24 at 18. 
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69 The Rules were signed in the Dutch port city of Rotterdam on 23 September 2009. 
70 P Sooksripaisarnkit ‘Enhancing of Carriers’ Liabilities in the Rotterdam Rules- Too Expensive Costs for 
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Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules has extended the carrier’s obligation of exercising 
due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy throughout the voyage at sea.74 The 
extension of the carrier’s obligation to exercise due diligence throughout the sea 
voyage has been met with hostility by carriers who fear that it will result in an 
increase of freight charges and create uncertainty in the rules regulating the voyage 
at sea. It has been suggested that lack of clarity in the wording of Article 14 creates 
some uncertainty as to when the voyage actually ends.75 It could be argued that the 
voyage ends when the vessel docks, it could also be argued that voyage ends only 
once the cargo is unloaded, resulting in divergent interpretations of this provision. 
Like the Hamburg Rules, the Rotterdam Rules have done away with the negligent 
navigation defense. The rationale behind the exclusion of this defense is to bring the 
carrier’s liabilities in line with their current responsibilities under public international 
law.76 The ‘International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for 
Pollution Prevention’77 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘ISM Code’), provides that: the 
carrier needs to define and document all the responsibilities and authority of all 
personnel who perform, verify and manage work conducted on the vessel relating to 
and affecting safety and pollution prevention. The carrier is also required to ensure 
that adequate resources and shore-based support are provided to personnel or 
designated persons to carry out their functions and duties.78 The exclusion of the 
negligent navigation defense in the Rotterdam Rules has proven to be unpopular 
among ship owning nations.  
The aim of the drafters of the Rotterdam Rules was to extend the liability of the 
carrier further than the provisions contained in the Hague-Visby Rules.79 This was in 
an effort to bring about uniformity and keep abreast of technological advancements 
in the modern era of maritime transport. At a glance, the Rules seem to increase the 
liability of the carrier through the deletion of the negligent navigation defence and 
extending the period of responsibility of the carrier. However, upon closer inspection 
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of the Rules, they appear unsuccessful in increasing the carrier’s liability, as the 
deletion of the negligent navigation defence is an effort to balance the interests of 
both ship-owners and cargo-owners.80 The obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel 
throughout the voyage is already a current practice that is contained in the ISM 
Code.81 Practitioners and academics also caution that the lengthy and complicated 
provisions of the Rules would make it challenging to interpret and apply them, 
causing legal uncertainty. 
It is of importance to note that since 2015,82 the Rotterdam Rules have only been 
signed by 25 states and ratified by 3 states. 83  The Rules can only come into 
operation within a year of ratification by the twentieth signatory state. 84  The 
ratification process has been extremely slow and the major maritime trading nations 
are reluctant to accede to the Rules. According to the CMI, the Executive Council 
established an International Working Group (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IWG’) to 
monitor the implementation and adoption of the Rotterdam Rules.85 Recent attempts 
of drafting an ‘Accession Kit of the Rotterdam Rules’ 86  by the Secretariat of 
UNCITRAL are examples of efforts made by the international community to try and 
promote the ratification of the Rotterdam Rules. One of the objectives of the kit is to 
assist developing nations in adopting the Rotterdam Rules. Whether the ‘Accession 
Kit to the Rotterdam Rules’ actually achieves its objective of enabling more nations 
to ratify the Rules, remains to be seen.  
2.4  The Rotterdam Rules- A South African Perspecti ve 
The Rotterdam Rules have not been ratified by South Africa nor any of South 
Africa’s major trading partners.87 South Africa passed the Merchant Shipping Act 57 
of 1951 (hereinafter referred to as 'SA Merchant Shipping Act') as domestic 
legislation giving effect to the Hague Rules. The SA Merchant Shipping Act was 
repealed by the Carriage of Goods Act in 1986 (hereinafter referred to as 'SA 
COGSA'). The SA COGSA has enacted the Hague-Visby Rules as Schedule to the 
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Act. 88  The Hague-Visby Rules now appear verbatim as Schedule 1 of the SA 
COGSA.  
In August 2014, the South African government launched Operation Phakisa, which is 
based on the Malaysian approach of the ‘Big Fast Results Methodology’.89 This 
methodology was proven to give remarkable results in economic transformation and 
service delivery within a very short time frame. 90  Operation Phakisa has been 
launched to fast track the priorities of the National Development Plan, which include 
job creation and socio-economic services.91 Operation Phakisa is being implemented 
in a number of sectors including the oceans economy, which is relevant to South 
African maritime law. The aim of Operation Phakisa in terms of the oceans economy 
is to harness the commercial opportunities stemming from South Africa’s vast coast 
line and areas of maritime practice in order to grow the economy while still protecting 
the South African coastline and maritime environment.92 One of the main objectives 
of Operation Phakisa is a review of ocean related legislation. 93  A review and 
amendment of SA COGSA has been proposed, to bring it in line with the Rotterdam 
Rules, in the event that the Rules will be widely accepted and ratified.94It is hoped 
that the international perception that the Rotterdam Rules favour the carrier will 
encourage ship-owners to register their ships on the South African registry.95 
Operation Phakisa has not shown much achievement from its inception to date.96 It 
is hoped that under the presidency of Cyril Ramaphosa, who has promised 
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economic reform, that the aims and objectives of the oceans economy will be 
realised.  
2.5  Conclusion 
The global rules pertaining to the carriage of goods by sea have developed through 
the centuries as a result of constant codification and reform. As discussed in this 
chapter, the common law defences available to the carrier stem from early Roman 
law and were developed further under English common law. As maritime trade 
flourished through the ages, these defenses were in some form or the other, 
incorporated into all the major international carriage regimes that regulate the rules 
pertaining to the carriage of goods by sea. The Harter Act and the Hague-Visby 
Rules have proved to be the most influential maritime regimes in contributing to the 
development of the carrier’s rights and responsibilities. Under the Harter Act, the two 
most significant developments pertaining to the carrier were the lessening of the 
absolute obligation of the carrier to that of the exercise of due diligence and the 
introduction of the negligent navigation defence.97  The Hague-Visby Rules have 
been ratified or incorporated by the majority of maritime trading nations, including 
South Africa and its trading partners and has been widely accepted as the dominant 
regime regulating the carriage of goods by sea. The Hague-Visby Rules contain a 
comprehensive list of defences that may be invoked by the carrier, one of the 
reasons that fosters the perception that the Rules are carrier oriented to the 
detriment of the cargo owner. The relatively new Rotterdam Rules that aim to bring 
about uniformity in the modern era of transportation of goods, has yet to prove 
whether it will be successful in achieving this objective. The continuous, fast-paced 
technological and economic advancements of maritime trade create the need for the 
modernisation and harmonisation of the international rules governing the carriage of 
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CHAPTER 3: THE ESSENTIAL AVERMENTS OF THE CLAIMS AN D 
DEFENCES UNDER ARTICLESS III AND IV OF THE HAGUE- 
VISBY RULES 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter serves as a general summary for the order of procedures in cargo 
claims. In this chapter the author will briefly outline the onus of proof that the parties 
are subject to, followed by the order of proceedings and examination of the essential 
averments of a cargo claim under the Hague-Visby Rules. This chapter serves as a 
practical guide to the running of cargo claims and needs to be read in conjunction 
with the general principles of the three defences that will be examined in the 
following chapters of this study. 
3.2 Onus of Proof 
The Hague Visby Rules do not specifically set out a general rule for the division of 
the onus of proof in a cargo claim. However, Article IV (1) specifically provides for 
the onus of proof where the loss or damage to the cargo was caused by 
unseaworthiness. Article IV (1) states ‘Whenever loss or damage has resulted from 
unseaworthiness, the burden of proving the exercise of due diligence shall be on the 
carrier or other person claiming exemption under this article.’98 The second specific 
provision contained in the Rules relating to the onus of proof is Article IV (2)(q). This 
provision is also known as the ‘catch all’ exception. Article IV(2)(q) provides that the 
carrier is not responsible for any loss or damage to cargo arising from any other 
cause arising without the actual fault or negligence of the carrier or its servants, but 
the burden of proof shall rest on the carrier or the persons relying on this exception 
to prove that no negligence or fault on their part contributed to the loss or damage.99 
In a cargo claim, the carrier bears the heavier onus of proof, which rests upon four 
general principles of proof that are derived from common law and that are also 
present in the Hague-Visby Rules.100 The first principle that is a requirement under 
both the common law and the Hague-Visby Rules is that 'the carrier is prima facie 
liable for all loss or damage to cargo received in good order and out-turned short or 
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in bad order.'101 The carrier is prima facie  liable for loss or damage to cargo that is 
presumed to have occurred while the cargo was under its care, provided that the 
cargo was received in good order, and then subsequently delivered in bad order.  
This presumption is reflected in the Hague-Visby Rules, which state that: 'Such a bill 
of lading shall be prima facie evidence of the receipt by the carrier of the goods as 
therein described in accordance with paragraph 3 (a), (b) and (c)'102 The carrier will 
discharge the burden by showing that the loss or damage was caused by one of the 
excepted defences as contained in Article IV (2)(a) to (q).  
The second principle is that the parties must make proof of all the facts available to 
them.103 The maxim 'who asserts must prove' applies in a cargo claim.104 Courts will 
consider all the evidence in a cargo claim and will require proof that goes beyond a 
clean bill of lading and a bad order receipt. Litigants must ensure that upon first sight 
of damage, early inspections and surveys are conducted on both the vessel and the 
cargo; this is useful to both the carrier and the cargo- owner.105 The carrier will want 
to know the extent of the damage to the cargo, and the cargo-owner will want to be 
aware of the condition of the vessel. It is of importance for litigants, especially the 
carrier, to preserve contemporaneous evidence as well as documentary evidence 
such as log books; maintenance records; 106  bills of lading that may contain 
qualifications relating to the cargo and bad order receipts. 
Article III Rule 6 of the Hague-Visby Rules stipulates that the cargo-owner is required 
to notify the carrier of damage at the port of discharge before or at the time of the 
removal of the goods for delivery, or within three days of the loss becoming 
apparent. Failure to notify the carrier, will result in a prima facie assumption that the 
cargo was received in good condition or as described in the bill of lading.107Article III 
Rule 6 further stipulates that the carrier shall be discharged from all liability for 
 
101 Tetley W Marine Cargo Claims 2 ed (1978) 47. 
102 Article III (4) of the Hague-Visby Rules. 
103 Tetley op cit note 101 at 50. 
104 Szymonowski & Co v Beck & Co [1923] 1 KB at 466. 





damaged cargo unless summons has been issued within one year of the delivery of 
the cargo or the date when the cargo ought to have been delivered.108 
The third principle of proof is that the onus of proof in a cargo claim is that of making 
proof to a reasonable degree.109 The onus of proof needs to be of a reasonable 
degree in the circumstances. The onus of proof, even in the rebuttal of prima facie 
evidence only needs to be proven on a balance of probabilities.110  In States Marine 
Corp v Producer Coop Packing Co,111  it was held that the carrier only has an 
'ordinary burden of proof' i.e. on the preponderance of evidence, and the carrier 
need not show 'clear and convincing' proof. 
The fourth principle of proof relates to the 'concealment, modification or destruction 
of key evidence'.112 If courts find any concealment, modification or the destruction of 
key evidence, all evidence put forth by that party will be viewed as suspicious.113 
Proper investigations must be conducted by both parties especially in claims where 
the cause of the loss or damage is not clearly established and the parties must have 
adequate documentary evidence to discharge the burden of proof placed on them.114 
In The Fjord Wind,115 the ship's crankpin bearings had failed for unknown reasons, 
and prior failings had not been fully investigated by the carrier. The court held that 
the carrier can only discharge the burden of proof by showing that it and the vessel's 
engine builder did not fail to observe any lines of enquiry that competent experts 
would have been reasonably expected to carried out and that in the absence of 
evidence of investigations that were expected to be carried out, the carrier was 
unable to discharge the burden of proving that it exercised due diligence in making 
the vessel seaworthy. 116  In The Fjord Wind, 117  the carrier also did not supply 
 
108 Article III Rule 6 of the Hague-Visy Rules. 
109 Tetley op cit note 101 at 51. 
110 Balance of probability is referred to the preponderance of evidence.  
111 States Marine Corp of Delaware v Producers Coop Packing Co., 310 F. 2d 206, 1963 AMC 246 (9 Cir. 1962). 
112 Tetley op cit note 101 at 52. 
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114 Ibid. 
115 Eridania SPA & Others v Rudolf A. Oetker& Others (The Fjord Wind) [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 307. 
116 Eridania SPA & Others v Rudolf A. Oetker& Others (The Fjord Wind) [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 307; upheld 
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sufficient documentary evidence on the engine builder's investigations and these 
omissions were regarded as lack of due diligence on the part of the carrier.118 
3.3 The Order of Proof and the Essential Averments in a Cargo Claim under 
the Hague-Visby Rules 
3.3.1 The Order of Proof 
The order of proof is the order in which the parties will present their evidence at trial. 
Under the Hague-Visby Rules, the parties need to address their respective 
obligations by a series of essential averments. These averments will follow a certain 
order of stages, beginning with the plaintiff in a cargo claim and the onus of proof 
then shifting from the cargo-owner to the carrier and back, with each stage of the 
proceedings. The nature of the order of proof in a cargo claim can be described as a 
game of ‘ping-pong’. 
The order of proceedings in a maritime claim at court is as follows:119 
(a) The claimant (cargo-owner) begins by prima facie proving its loss. 
(b) The defendant (carrier) will then prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the 
cause of the loss or damage was not as a result of lack of due diligence on 
the part of the carrier to make the vessel seaworthy and/or cargo-worthy; 
and/or that the loss or damage was caused by one of the exculpatory 
exceptions contained under Article IV (2) of the Hague-Visby Rules. 
(c) The claimant will counter-argue and on a balance of probabilities prove the 
essential averments of its loss. 
(d) The defendant may either succeed on its averments at (b) and the claim will 
fail or the claimant will succeed with the claim through its counter-argument, 
notwithstanding the carrier may prove its right to limit its liability. 
 
3.3.2 The Essential Averments of a Cargo Claim unde r the Hague-Visby Rules. 
As aforementioned, the onus of proof in a cargo claim shifts from the cargo-owner to 
the carrier and back at each stage of the proceedings. Under the Hague-Visby 
 
118 The Fjord Wind op cit note at 204 and 206. 
119 Summarised from the breakdown of Onus of Proof set out in Hare op cit note 2 at 790-791. 
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Rules, the parties need to make a series of essential averments to satisfy their 
respective obligations. 
The essential averments that the cargo-owner and carrier need to make during their 
arguments are set out below: 
The cargo-owner must primarily aver the following:120 
• The cargo-owner is the owner of the cargo or has the right to sue; 
• There was a contract of carriage or a commission of a delict (tort); 
• The defendant is the carrier or the carrier’s servant; 
• The cargo was handed in good order and condition. 
• The cargo was out-turned damaged or short. 
• The quantified/ monetary value of the loss or damage.121 
 
The carrier must aver the following in its rebuttal averment:122 
• That the loss or damage was caused by an exception contained in Article IV 
(2) of the Hague-Visby Rules.  
• If the ‘catch all’ exception 2(q) is pleaded, the carrier will also need to show its 
absence of actual fault or privity. 
 
The cargo-owner’s counter-argument must contain the following averments:123 
• That the vessel was unseaworthy and the unseaworthiness was as a result of 
the carrier’s lack of due diligence;124 or 
• The loss or damage was as a result of the carrier’s failure to make the vessel 
cargo-worthy.125 
• If the carrier is relying on the defence of fire, that the fire was caused by the actual 
fault or privity of the carrier.126 
 
120 Summarised from the breakdown of Essential Averments set out in Tetley op cit note 101 at 54-55. 
121 Article IV (5)(b) of the Hague-Visby Rules. 
122 Hare op cit note 2 at 791. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Article IV (1) read with Article III (1) of the Hague-Visby Rules. 
125 Article III (2) of the Hague-Visby Rules. 
126 Article IV (2)(b) of the Hague-Visby Rules. 
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In the event of the cargo claimant succeeding in its claim, the carrier may still assert 
its right to limit its liability, on a balance of probabilities. 
The carrier’s limitation plea would contain the following pleadings:127 
• The cargo-owner did not declare the value or the nature of the cargo, or if 
such declaration was made, the carrier was justified in not entering such 
declaration on the bill of lading.  
• The number of packages or units or the mass of the cargo was stated on the 
bill of lading. 
• The Special Drawing Right (SDR) 128  is equivalent to the currency to be 
determined by the law of the Court in which the claim was adjudicated 
upon.129 
 
3.4 The Exercise of Due Diligence and the defences available to the carrier    
under the Hague-Visby Rules 
As per Article III (1) of the Hague-Visby Rules, the carrier in a cargo claim has to 
prove that it exercised due diligence before and at the beginning of the voyage to 
make the vessel both seaworthy and cargo-worthy in all aspects. Article IV (1) 
stipulates that if the carrier cannot prove such due diligence, it must at the very least 
prove that its lack of exercise of due diligence was not the cause of the loss or 
damage. The carrier has a primary obligation to exercise due diligence, however, if 
the carrier can show that the cause of the loss or damage was as a result of 
something other than its lack of due diligence, additional defences remain open to 
the carrier, as contained in Article IV (2) of the Hague-Visby Rules. 
Hare explains that the burden of proving due diligence or reliance upon one of the 
exculpatory exceptions as contained in the Rules rests upon the carrier.130 This is as 
a result of the legal maxim ‘who asserts, must prove’, since the carrier is relying on 
 
127 Hare op cit note 2 at 791. 
128 The Special Drawing Right (SDR) is an international reserve asset, created by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to supplement its member countries’ official reserves. The value of the SDR is based on a basket of 
five currencies- the U.S dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen, the Chinese renminbi and the British pound. 
‘Special Drawing Right (SDR)’ (19 April 2018) available at  
https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/14/51/Special-Drawing-Right-SDR, accessed 
on 10 November 2018.  
129 Article IV(5)(d) of the Hague-Visby Rules. 
130 Hare op cit note 2 at 794. 
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the exception the onus is on him to prove same. Further, the carrier will have access 
to information proving causation, which would not ordinarily be available to the cargo 
claimant.131 
The list of exceptions contained in Article IV (2) of the Hague-Visby Rules, take the 
place of the common law exceptions that the carrier would have otherwise relied 
upon. This is an essential consequence of the parties agreeing, or the statutory 
provisions of the Rules providing, that the carrier can have no lesser liability than 
what is prescribed by the Rules.132 The exceptions of nautical fault, fire and heavy 
weather will be discussed in the following chapters.  
3.5 Conclusion 
The Hague-Visby Rules do not specifically contain a general rule for the division of 
the burden of proof. However, the parties to a cargo claim under the Rules have to 
make essential averments during their arguments to address their respective 
obligations and discharge the onus placed on them. There are a number of general 
principles pertaining to the burden of proof that the parties have to adhere to in order 
to successfully discharge the burden placed upon them. The exercise of due 
diligence to make a vessel seaworthy and cargo- worthy is central to a cargo claim, 
want of due diligence leaves the carrier vulnerable to suit, but at the same time it 
also provides for the carrier to rely upon the exculpatory exceptions as contained in 













CHAPTER 4: THE DEFENCE OF NEGLIGENT NAVIGATION 
4.1 Introduction 
It is commonly agreed among maritime commentators and lawyers that the defence 
of negligent navigation is one of the most notorious defences that is available to the 
carrier in a cargo claim due to the controversy surrounding this defence and the fact 
that it has been the subject matter of much litigation. This defence has also been 
among the most fiercely contested issues that have come up in the negotiations 
leading up to the finalisation of the modern international conventions regulating the 
carriage of goods by sea. This defence is also commonly and interchangeably 
known by its common law names, ‘the negligent navigation defence’ or ‘nautical 
fault’. 
Even prior to the inclusion of this defence in the Harter Act and the Hague-Visby 
Rules, exceptions pertaining to errors in navigation or the management of the vessel 
have routinely been included in bills of lading to exempt the carrier from liability in the 
event of loss or damage resulting from this exception.133 The defence of negligent 
navigation was first enacted into legislation by the Harter Act in 1893 and was 
subsequently incorporated into the widely ratified Hague and Hague-Visby Rules. 
Thus, this defence is available to carriers in the majority of maritime trading nations, 
including South Africa, as a result of its enactment of the Hague-Visby Rules.134 It is 
of importance to note that later created international carriage conventions, such as 
the Hamburg Rules and the Rotterdam Rules do not contain this defence in favour of 
the carrier. The reasons for this will be discussed later in this chapter. 
4.2.1 The Definition and Scope of Article IV(2)(a) of the Hague-Visby Rules 
The defence of negligent navigation is contained in Article IV (2)(a) of the Hague-
Visby Rules.  
Article IV Rule 2: 
‘Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or 
resulting from- 
 
133 J F Wilson Carriage of Goods by Sea 7 ed (2010) 273. 
134 Hare op cit note 2 at 799. 
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Act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the servants of the 
carrier in the navigation or in the management of the ship.’135 
This defence is unique as it affords protection to the sea carrier, which protections 
are not available to carriers of other modes of transport or provided for under 
international conventions governing other modes of transport.136 In its simplest form, 
the aim of the defence is to provide the carrier protection against liability for loss or 
damage to cargo resulting from errors in navigation or management of the vessel.137 
Once negligence on the part of the carrier is established the defence becomes 
inapplicable.138 However, Article IV (2)(a) is aimed at providing the carrier with a 
defence where negligence has occurred. 
4.2.1.1 ‘Act, Neglect or Default’ 
This exception covers the carrier for the ‘act, neglect or default’ of the master, 
mariner, pilot or the servants of the carrier. As can be seen in some of the cases 
briefly referred to hereunder, courts have interpreted this cover to extend to the 
failure to act and non-performance of the duties of the carrier. 139  This point is 
illustrated in The Olivebank case,140 where the 5th Circuit Court of Appeal upheld the 
decision of the court of first instance. In this case, cargo was damaged as a result of 
the decision by management, not to close the skylight or the vent covers of the 
vessel. The claimants argued that the decision taken by management of the vessel 
was not an act but rather an omission. The Court of Appeal held that the claimants 
had misconstrued the district court's use of the phrase "management decision".141 
Neglect by management also relieves the carrier/ship of liability under COGSA.142 In 
the case The Sanfield,143  the court held that the decision not to open a sluice gate 
which would have been used to empty the bilges, for twenty days, was an error in 
management. 
 
135 Article IV (2)(a) of the Hague-Visby Rules. 
136 Wilson op cit note 133 at 273. 
137 Ibid 
138 The Satya Kailash [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 588.  
139 V Rochester Nautical Fault: A Historical and Multi-Jurisdictional Study of the Exemption for Errors Relating 
to Navigation and Management of the Vessel in Modern Carriage Law (published LLD thesis, University of Cape 
Town, 2008) 49.  
140 Folger Coffe Co. v Oliverbank, 2000 AMC 844 (5 Cir. 2000). 
141 Ibid at 849. 
142 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936. The United States of America incorporated The Hague Rules into their 
domestic legislation passing the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act in 1936. (Hereinafter referred to as 'US COGSA'). 
143 The Sanfield 92 F.663 (1989). 
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The phrase ‘act, neglect or default’ has been given a broad interpretation by 
maritime scholars and jurists. Rochester explains that the phrase goes further than 
simple acts of negligence and can include ‘gross negligence’.144 Maritime authors 
concur that the wording of the exception extends protection to the carrier by covering 
wilful acts and conduct by the master and servants of the vessel as well as 
intentional acts that include ‘malicious acts, barratry and felonious acts’.145 Thus, the 
carrier is afforded greater protection that extends past simple fault.    
4.2.1.2 ‘the Master, Mariner, Pilot or the Servants  of the Carrier’ 
The provision states that the act, neglect or default must be committed by either the 
'Master, Mariner, Pilot or servants of the carrier', in order for the exception to be 
relied upon by the carrier. If the fault or error is as a result of the carrier's own 
negligence, the exception becomes inapplicable.  Examples of such negligence on 
the part of the ship-owner include a ship-owner negligently appointing an intoxicated 
captain or negligently failing to instruct that a pilot be employed for the vessel.146 
 The provision does not expressly state that a ship-owner's personal acts and 
knowledge do not fall within the ambit of Article IV (2)(a) of the Hague-Visby Rules. 
In order to determine when the carrier can rely on this exception in order to escape 
liability, certain jurisdictions have amended their sea carriage legislation to provide 
that the liability of the carrier is based on its personal fault.147 The British Merchant 
Shipping Act of 1894 contains the expression 'actual fault or privity' and the US 
Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, contains the equivalent expression, 'privity or 
knowledge'.148 In Article IV (2)(b) and Article IV (2)(q) of the Hague-Visby Rules, 
expressly provides for the 'actual fault or privity of the carrier,' this is instructive of 
when fault is attributable to the ship-owner.149 
In the Australian case, James Patrick & Co Pty Ltd v Union of SS Co of New 
Zealand,150 'actual fault or privity' is described as 'implies some culpability on the part 
of the owner. It may consist in being privy to the neglect, unskilfulness or improper 
 
144 Rochester op cit note 139 at 51. 
145 Rochester op cit note 139 at 52. 
146 S Boyd Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading 20 ed (1996) 238. 
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act or omission of a servant or agent. It may be the neglect or the impudent or 
wrongful act of the ship-owner himself. But the ship-owner must in some way be to 
blame... A failure to make himself aware of what he ought to know is or may be an 
actual fault'.151 
If a vessel is owned personally by a sole owner, the act or fault must be of that sole 
owner itself. However, in modern maritime trade, ships are almost always owned by 
corporations and fault or liability is attributable to the personality of the 
corporation.152 Liability is attributable to a corporation through the concept of the 
'alter ego',153  this concept together with the concept of 'actual fault or privity' is 
discussed in the English case of Lennard Carrying Co v Asiatic Petroleum Co.154 In 
this case, it was held that a corporation is directed by someone directing the mind 
and will of the corporation. These persons may include anyone under the direction of 
the shareholders, members of the board of directors or persons having authority 
under the articles of association.155 
English Approach to the ‘alter-ago’ of a corporation 
Who constitutes the ‘alter ego’ of a company has been deliberated upon extensively 
in English case law. In Lennard Carrying Co v Asiatic Petroleum,156 the Privy Council 
held that the alter-ego of a corporation would be attributed to its board of directors; 
this would also include persons in senior management positions. However, the 
English Court of Appeal in the case The Lady Gwendolen157 extended the ‘alter-ego’ 
to include middle management personnel. 
American Approach to the ‘alter-ego’ of a Corporation 
The term used in the United States of America, when looking at this issue is ‘privity 
or knowledge’.  Courts in the United States have determined that ‘privity or 
knowledge’ goes further than that interpreted and applied in English jurisprudence 
 
151 James Patrick & Co Pty Ltd v Union SS Co of New Zealand (1938) 60 CLR 650 (Australian High Court) 670. 
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and also encompasses management that is lower on the corporate ladder. 158 
Rochester explains that courts in the United States of America have held that 
employees of a corporation with supervisory or discretionary powers will have privity 
or knowledge of the corporation.159 In the case of In re Hercules Carriers Inc,160 an 
allision with a bridge occurred whilst the pilot was in control of the vessel; the allision 
resulted in the loss of life and cargo. The allision occurred as a result of the pilot’s 
excessive speed in poor visibility conditions. The Court of Appeal held that the crew 
were negligent as they failed to halt the pilot’s negligent actions.161 It was further held 
that the ship-owner was aware of the negligence of the crew and on that point; the 
ship-owner had allowed the practice of letting the pilots on board make navigational 
decisions.162 
As discussed above, the approach taken by the United States in respect of ‘privity or 
knowledge’ of the ship-owner is considered contentious as it casts a wider net, 
encompassing employees further down in the corporate ladder. This notion favours 
the cargo interest and places stricter liability on the ship-owner, making it difficult for 
the carrier to be able to rely on the exception of negligent navigation. The 
jurisprudence of the Commonwealth countries in respect of ‘actual fault or privity,’ 
considers the expression to only encompass management and senior personnel 
such as members of the board of directors.163 In taking this stance, the number of 
persons that actual fault or privity can be attributed to personally, decreases and the 
ship-owner will be liable for fault or negligence that is attributed to him personally. 
This is considered a much softer stance than that of the United States of America 
and what appears to be the approach preferred by most other maritime trading 
nations. Thus, taking the stance, that the act or fault must be that of one of the 
classes of persons stipulated in the provision.164 The actions of any other persons, 
such as an agent of the vessel or an independent contractor will be unable to invoke 
this exception.165 If act or fault pertaining to the navigation or management of the 
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vessel is not committed by a person falling within categories expressly stated in the 
provision, then the carrier is liable for the loss or damage to the cargo. 
4.2.1.3 ‘In the Navigation or in the Management of the Ship’ 
The exception contained in Article IV (2)(a) of the Hague-Visby Rules cover acts or 
fault in the navigation and management of the vessel, however, the words 
‘navigation’ and ‘management’ are not expressly defined in Rules. 
In maritime practice the word ‘navigation’ can be broadly defined as, the sailing and 
manoeuvring of a vessel, it would also include matters of seamanship166 and matters 
concerning the safety and security of the vessel.167 Wilson lists examples of faults of 
navigation, where cargo was lost or damaged due to the negligence of the crew or 
master.168 These include incidents where the vessel struck a reef,169 ran aground170 
or collided with another vessel.171 
An act, neglect or default in the management of the ship leads to difficulty in courts 
interpreting, which acts or defaults fall under the management of the vessel. Article 
III (2) of the Hague-Visby Rules explains that the carrier shall 'properly and carefully 
load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for and discharge the goods carried'. 172 
Difficulty arises as fault in the management of the vessel needs to be distinguished 
from the carrier's duty to properly care for the cargo as contained in Article III Rule 2 
of the Hague-Visby Rules.173 
In the case of Gosse Millerd v Canadian Government Merchant Marine,174 the House 
of Lords held that the term 'management of the ship' as stated in the Rules, reflect 
their common law meaning. Lord Hailsham held that words did not extend to cover 
'want of care of cargo but it did include 'want of care of vessel indirectly affecting the 
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cargo'.175 The cases of The Ferro176 and The Glenochil177 reflect the view taken in by 
the House of Lords in Gosse Millerd v Canadian Government Merchant Marine.178 
If an act, default or negligence relates primarily to the care of the vessel, it shall fall 
under the management of the vessel. If the act or fault relates primarily to the cargo, 
it will not be an act of the vessel's management, falling under the exception of Article 
IV (2)(a) of the Rules.179 In The Iron Gippsland,180 the negligent operation of a gas 
tanker which was utilised for the protection of the vessel constituted mismanagement 
of the cargo. The same view was taken in the case of The Eternity,181 where the 
negligent operation of a valve constituted mismanagement of the cargo. On the other 
hand, in The Hector,182 failure to secure tarpaulins on the vessel's hatches amounted 
to an act in the management of the ship, 'as the structure in its entirety formed part of 
the ship's defences'.183 In The Hector,184 failure to secure tarpaulins on the hatches 
at the beginning of the voyage resulted in cargo damage due to the ingress of water 
during rough weather. The forecast indicated that weather conditions may improve, 
thus the master did not instruct the crew to secure the tarpaulins. The court held that 
the master exercised due diligence in making the vessel seaworthy and that securing 
the tarpaulins was an act in the management of the vessel.185  
In the US, courts apply the 'primary purpose' test to establish whether the actions 
were conducted in the interests of the ship or the cargo.186 
The defence of negligent navigation does not extend to cover negligent failure to use 
the apparatus of the vessel for protection of the cargo.187 In the case of Foreman and 
Ellams Ltd v Federal Steam Navigation Company,188 refrigerating machinery that 
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was negligently operated by the crew of the vessel did not fall under this exception, 
as the machinery was employed solely for the care of the cargo.189 
Difficulty in discerning whether an act or neglect pertains to ship or cargo 
management arises when containerised cargo is involved. Containers are 
considered to be part of the ship's apparatus or equipment if the containers are 
supplied by the vessel itself,190 or containers can be viewed as being an extension of 
the vessel's superstructure.191 Faults or neglect relating to the cargo can equate to a 
breach of Article III (2)- proper care of the cargo, or mismanagement of the vessel as 
contained in Article IV (2)(a) of the Hague-Visby Rules. If the breach falls within the 
exception of Article IV (2)(a), the vessel will not be liable irrespective of any breach 
of Article III (2), as Article III (2) is 'subject to the provisions of Article IV'.192 
4.2.2 Scope of Article IV (2)(a) of the Hague-Visby  Rules 
The scope of the defence of negligent navigation becomes complicated as a result of 
the intersection between faults where the defence can be relied upon, and faults 
under which the carrier is liable for as a result of its failure to fulfil its obligations 
towards cargo care or its seaworthiness obligations, as contained under Article III (1) 
of the Hague-Visby Rules.193 Each case will have to be decided on the facts of the 
case and courts can resolve the issue by applying the 'primary purpose' test to the 
facts. 
4.3 Common Errors falling under the Defence of Negl igent Navigation  
4.3.1 Errors in the Navigation of the Vessel 
Errors in navigation are perceived to be fairly straightforward in nature and clear cut. 
The critical issue pertaining to errors in navigation is distinguishing between an 
actual error and the incompetence of the master or crew.194 This shall be discussed 
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Grounding is considered to be the most common error in navigation. A plethora of 
case law demonstrates that grounding as a result of faults, errors or negligence on 
the part of the pilot allows the carrier to escape liability under the negligent 
navigation exception. 
In the case of The Santa Leonor,195 the vessel ran aground as a result of wrong 
commands and a misjudged turn by the pilot; this led to the carrier being exempt 
from liability under the negligent navigation exception.196  
Rochester explains that where there are updated charts and notices available 
onboard a vessel, failure of the crew to utilise such resources would enable the 
carrier to rely on the exception, however, in a situation where no updated charts 
were provided, the exception would not apply.197 
Where the carrier is exempt from liability for damage as a result of grounding, the 
carrier still needs to exercise reasonable care to protect the cargo from further 
damage.198 In the case of the The West Cajoot,199 the court relieved the carrier of 
liability for the damage to the cargo that was caused by the grounding of the vessel. 
However, it was held that the carrier was responsible for the failure to remove the 
cargo of coconut oil from the deep tanks, so that the tanks could be examined for 
leaks.200   
4.3.1.2 Collisions 
Collisions are almost always considered to be an error in navigation, rather than a 
failure on the part of the carrier to make the vessel seaworthy. Collisions involving 
structures or allisions201  are considered to be an error in the navigation of the 
vessel.202 It was held that the exemption contained in Article IV (2)(a) of the Hague-
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Visby Rules applied in the case of Insurance Co of North America v S.S. Georgis A 
Georgilis.203 In this case, the cargo was damaged as a result of the ingress of water 
from the ballast tank due to an allision of the vessel with the wall of a lock.204 
There are certain instances where collisions have been considered to be a as result 
of failure to exercise due diligence in making the vessel seaworthy.205 An example of 
such is when the certifications or training of the crew responsible of the collision are 
considered to be insufficient. In the case of Protomac Transport v Ogden Marinew 
Inc,206 the master of the vessel was not present, standing watch, when the 3rd mate, 
who was on his first voyage, was at the wheel when the collision occurred. The Court 
held that the carrier did not exercise due diligence in the selecting of the crew, as the 
3rd mate was inexperienced and he should have been supervised by the master.207 
4.3.1.3 Storms 
 A classic example of an error in navigation is when a seaworthy vessel sets sail 
despite storm warnings or adverse weather reports.208 It is also considered an error 
in navigation when a vessel sails through a storm despite an alternative route being 
available.209 In the case of Hershey Chocolate Co v S.S. Mars,210 the master of the 
vessel sailed right through a centre of a storm, which resulted in the consignment of 
cocoa beans being damaged through a lack of ventilation. The claimant argued that 
the damage to the cargo could have been avoided if the master had sailed around 
the storm. The court found in favour of the carrier and held that the vessel was not 
liable for the damaged cargo as master’s action to sail through the storm constituted 
an error in navigation.211 
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In the case of Texas & Gulf S.S. v Parker,212 the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that the carrier may only rely on the defence of negligent navigation if the vessel was 
seaworthy for the voyage or for the anticipated bad weather.213 
Article 4 of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law with respect to 
Collisions between Vessels (hereinafter referred to as the ‘1910 Collision 
Convention’) states that: 
‘If two or more vessels are in fault the liability of each vessel is in proportion to 
the degree of the faults respectively committed. Provided that if, having regard 
to the circumstances, it is not possible to establish the degree of the 
respective faults, or if it appears that the faults are equal, the liability is 
apportioned equally.  
The damages caused, either to the vessels or their cargoes or to the effects 
or other property of the crews, passengers, or other persons onboard, are 
borne by the vessels in fault in the above proportions, and even to third 
parties a vessel is not liable for more than such proportions of such 
damages.’214 
As a result of the above principle of division of liability contained in the 1910 Collision 
Convention and the negligent navigation defence contained in the Hague Carriage 
Conventions, the owner of cargo carried on a vessel involved in a collision, shall only 
claim damages from the owner/s of the other colliding vessel in proportion to the fault 
of such vessel in contributing to the collision. The US is not a party to the 1910 
Collision Convention and their domestic law allows cargo-owners to ‘recover the full 
extent of [their] damages from the non-carrying vessel, including physical loss or 
damage, loss of value due to delay, cargo contribution to general average and lost 
pre-paid freight’.215 The non-carrying vessel will then seek a contribution from the 
carrying vessel, rendering the defence of negligent navigation inapplicable to the 
claim.216 This has been a source of contention for both US and foreign shipping 
interests. In order to remedy the situation, the Both-to-Blame Collision Clause was 
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introduced in the US It has become commercial practice in the US to have a Both-to-
Blame Collision clause inserted into the bill of lading so that the vessels can benefit 
from the exemption as contained in Article IV (2)(a) of the Rules should a collision 
situation occur.217 The Both-to-Blame Collision Clause allows the cargo-owner to 
hold the carrier liable where it would otherwise be exempt from liability by virtue of 
the provision contained in Article IV 9(2) (a) of the Hague-Visby Rules.218  
4.3.2 Errors in the Management of the Vessel 
There are three common errors that constitute errors in the management of the 
vessel, namely errors in refrigeration; ballasting and errors pertaining to hatch covers 
and tarpaulins. These errors shall be discussed in detail in the paragraphs below. 
Maritime courts and tribunals across the globe have repeatedly examined a host of 
various errors that constitute errors in management. These errors include, errors 
pertaining to drainage pipes, errors in sounding out and pumping bilges, and errors 
in activities pertaining to the cleaning, pumping and ventilation of the vessel.219     
4.3.2.1 Refrigeration 
Case law from various jurisdictions has consistently held that errors relating to the 
refrigeration apparatus of a vessel are not considered to be errors in the 
management of the vessel. In the English case of Forman & Ellams v Federal S.N. 
Co,220 a cargo of meat was damaged as a result of mismanagement of the vessel’s 
refrigeration apparatus, the court held that the cargo damage did not arise within the 
management of the vessel. It was further held that refrigerating hold and equipment 
form part of the vessel, however it is solely provided for the care of special cargo that 
may require refrigeration.221  
In the case of The Heinz Horn,222 a cargo of bananas was spoilt as a result of 
negligent operation of the refrigeration equipment. The court held that the negligent 
operation of refrigeration equipment caused the damage to the cargo and that 




219 Rochester op cit note 139 at 114. 
220 Forman & Ellams v Federal S.N. Co [1928] 30 L1. Lloyd’s Rep. 52 (K.B.). 
221 Ibid at 62.  
222 Heinrich C. Horn v CIA De  Navegacion (The Heinz Horn) [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 191 (5 Cir.1969). 
44 
 
not the vessel, as the primary purpose of the refrigeration apparatus was the proper 
storage of the cargo of bananas.223  
The above two cases illustrate that the operation of refrigeration equipment and 
apparatus clearly constitutes acts in the management of the cargo and not in the 
management of the vessel. This approach has been routinely followed in various 
jurisdictions across the globe. Refrigeration is considered to be provided solely for 
the use of cargo that requires special conditions and care. A carrier will not be able 
to rely on the defence of negligent navigation in a claim where there is loss or 
damage of refrigerated cargo due to these reasons. Article III (1)(c) of the Hague-
Visby Rules states that the carrier has to exercise due diligence in making the 
refrigerating holds, equipment and apparatus cargo-worthy. In a cargo claim for 
refrigerated cargo, the cargo claimant will have to show that the carrier did not 
exercise due diligence in making the vessel cargo-worthy under Article III (1)(c) of 
the Hague-Visby Rules.  Justice Wright in Forman & Ellams v Federal S.N. Co,224 
further explained that a vessel could continue being safely navigated and managed, 
even in the event of its refrigeration equipment failing and spoiling or damaging 
refrigerated cargo. 225  This reinforces the idea that acts relating to refrigeration 
equipment shall constitute acts in the management of the cargo and not that of the 
vessel itself. 
4.3.2.2 Ballasting 
Errors pertaining to ballasting are considered to be errors in the management of the 
vessel. In the case of The Glenochil,226 cargo was damaged as a result of negligent 
ballasting operations; the court held that the carrier was exempt from liability as it 
was an error in the management of the vessel.227 
When dealing with ballasting operations, it can often be difficult to distinguish 
between negligence in the management and care of cargo and errors in the 
management of the vessel. In the case of The Mormacsurf,228 the Appeal Court 
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found that the primary purpose of ballasting was to ensure the welfare of the entire 
vessel and not focus primarily on the care of the cargo and held that the ballasting, 
therefore, constituted an error in management.229 
The safety of the vessel as a whole is of paramount importance whilst at sea. 
Ballasting operations are performed to ensure optimal safety of the entire vessel 
during a voyage and the above-mentioned cases illustrate the view of most 
jurisdictions that that ballasting operations constitute acts in the management of the 
vessel.   
4.3.2.3 Hatch Covers and Tarpaulins 
Errors pertaining to hatch covers and tarpaulins are often contentious in nature. 
Each case needs to be decided upon its own facts, as these errors are often fact 
specific. 
When dealing with an error pertaining to hatch covers is it is often difficult to 
distinguish whether the error relates to the cargo or whether it is an error in the 
management of the vessel.230 A fair amount of case law exists in which the courts 
have deliberated on the liability and other implications of such errors, one such 
judgement, pertaining specifically to whether these errors fall within the ambit of the 
nautical fault exemption, will be examined in this study. 
In the case of International Packers v Ocean Steam Ship Co, 231  during heavy 
weather conditions, tarpaulins were stripped from the hatch covers, and cargo was 
damaged by the inlet of seawater. It was established that the crewmembers failed to 
lash the hatches securely and this error fell within the ambit of the nautical fault 
exception.232 
The carrier will be protected under the exemption in the event where tarpaulins or 
hatches have not been properly secured and as a result cargo has been lost or 
damaged. Tarpaulins and hatch covers are considered to be part of the vessel and 
are deemed to be essential to the safety of the vessel. However, as stated above, 
each case is fact specific and needs to be decided on its own facts and merits. 
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4.4  Exclusion of the Defence of Negligent Navigati on 
The defence of negligent navigation has been excluded in the latest two conventions 
relating to the carriage of goods by sea, namely, the Hamburg Rules and the 
Rotterdam Rules. One of the key objectives behind the formation of these two 
conventions was to modernise the laws regulating the carriage of goods by sea and 
bringing these in line with the technological advancements of the modern maritime 
trading. The rationale of the drafters of both the conventions is based on the 
argument that thanks to modern satellite technologies and innovations, such as 
radar and GPS,233 vessel operations as well as the actions of the crew can be 
monitored and controlled by expert land-based personnel. 234  The use of such 
technology has therefore solved the issue of the shore- based carrier losing control 
of the vessel once it departs from the port, which has always been the main concern 
justifying the birth and retention of the negligent navigation defence.235 Critics of the 
defence have further faulted it for defying the widely established legal doctrine of 
vicarious liability, arguing that maritime law in the context of the doctrine should not 
be promoting principles contrary to this important and widely accepted norm.236  
4.4.1 Exclusion of the Defence of Negligent Navigat ion under the Hamburg 
Rules 
As discussed in Chapter 2 of this study, none of the major maritime trading nations 
have acceded to the Hamburg Rules, nor have they incorporated its provisions into 
their domestic legislation. Upon deliberation of its provisions at the diplomatic 
conference preceding the Rules, it found that developing nations opposed the 
inclusion of the defence, while developed nations objected to the higher standard of 
liability being imposed on the carrier.237 The drafting of the Rules turned into an 
internationally negotiated political agreement rather than commercial compromise.238 
Drafters of the Hamburg Rules took heed of cargo interests by basing carrier liability 
on fault and holding the carrier responsible without exception for all loss or damage 
 
233 Global Positioning Systems 
234 Leau op cit note 179 at 2. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Leau op cit note 179 at 3. 





that results from the carrier’s own fault, or the fault of his servants or agents.239 
Needless to say, this approach did not sit well with delegates representing ship 
owning nations that were participating in the negotiations leading to the formation of 
these Rules. 
The varied views and interests of the different nations participating in these 
negotiations ultimately resulted in the lack of success of the Rules. Many delegates 
were of the view that the deletion of the defence was a mistake and that it played an 
important role in balancing the risks allocated between the parties to a sea carriage 
contract, which otherwise places a disproportionately heavier burden of liability on 
the carrier.  
Other delegates were of the view that despite the deletion of the outdated defence, 
the Hamburg Rules was not a major maritime achievement as it only slightly shifted 
the balance of liability in favour of cargo-owners, without revolutionising the existing 
liability system.240  
The Hamburg Rules have not been well-received by the majority of maritime trading 
nations and have only been acceded by few nations with no significant influence in 
maritime trade. It is therefore difficult to determine what impact, if at all any, that the 
deletion of the nautical fault defence in the Hamburg Rules, has had on maritime 
cargo liability. 
4.4.2 Exclusion of the Defence of Negligent Navigat ion under the Rotterdam 
Rules 
The Rotterdam Rules emerged as a result of the failure of the Hamburg Rules and 
the urgent need to harmonise the rules governing carriage of goods by sea.  
The Rotterdam Rules followed the lead of the Hamburg Rules by omitting the 
negligent navigation defence. The Rules state that notwithstanding the exceptions 
contained in Article 17,241 the carrier will be liable for the loss, damage, or delay of 
the cargo if the claimant proves that the fault of the carrier contributed to, or caused 
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the circumstances that the carrier relies upon in the listed exceptions. 242  The 
exceptions contained under the Rules act as rebuttable presumptions of the absence 
of fault as opposed to exonerations from liability as contained in the Hague-Visby 
Rules.243 
As stated in Chapter 2 of this study, the aim of the Rotterdam Rules is to establish 
uniformity in the rules governing the international carriage of goods. The deletion of 
the negligent navigation defence is an adjustment aimed at balancing the interests of 
both the cargo-owner and the ship-owner, and it further seeks to bring the liabilities 
of the sea carrier in line with the liabilities of carriers of other modes of 
transportation.244  
The Rotterdam Rules will only come into effect upon ratification by twenty countries; 
to date only four countries have ratified the Rules. The ratification process over the 
past eleven years has been extremely slow. The majority of maritime trading nations 
are cautious of the Rules and have chosen not to accede to the Rules. Reasons 
attributed to the non-accession of the Rules by the majority of the states, are firstly, 
their familiarity of the well-known and applied Hague-Visby Rules that have been in 
existence for many decades, and secondly, ship-owning nations are wary of the 
Rotterdam Rules due to the perception that the deletion of the defence will lead to an 
increase in the risks borne by the carrier and this in turn will result in increased 
freight rates that would negatively impact on cargo interests.245 
Due to technological advancements discussed above, it is argued that there is no 
longer the need to include an antiquated defence, such as the negligent navigation 
defence, in international carriage conventions, that has the potential to harm cargo 
interests. However, the deletion of the defence in the Rotterdam Rules has not been 
as widely welcomed as was expected. As already mentioned, the reluctance of 
maritime nations to embrace the Rotterdam Rules is evident from the lack of 
ratification of the Rules. It was hoped that the ‘Accession Kit of the Rotterdam 
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Rules’246 would promote the faster ratification of the Rules. However, at present it 
does not look too promising. 
The case of the Tasman Pioneer, 247  illustrates the continued dominance of the 
Hague-Visby Rules in recent years. In the case, which was heard before New 
Zealand courts, cargo was lost as a result of the vessel grounding due to the master 
of the vessel, deviating from the agreed route in order to take a shortcut.248 The 
master attempted to conceal his deviation of the vessel, which was the cause of the 
grounding, by falsifying charts and failing to honestly and timeously inform the 
coastguard about the grounding. The cargo-owner argued that such misconduct on 
the part of the carrier would not allow the carrier to rely on the defence of negligent 
navigation as contained under Article IV (2)(a) of the Hague- Visby Rules. The court 
of first instance held that the carrier could not rely on the defence under Article IV 
(2)(a) of the Rules, as the master’s actions were not bona fide in the navigation or 
management of the vessel. The Court of Appeal interpreted the provision narrowly 
and held that an ‘act in the navigation or the management of the ship’ would exclude 
selfish or dishonest conduct by the master. Duly, the carrier was unable to rely on 
the defence. The Supreme Court, however, overturned the decision of the lower 
courts and held that the ordinary meaning of the words in the provision should be 
applied; however, carriers would not be able to rely on the defence in the event of 
barratry.249 The Supreme Court held that the purpose of the wording in the provision 
was to make carriers liable for loss or damage caused by events in their direct 
control but not otherwise. Thus, the carrier was able to escape liability. This case is a 
prime example of how the defence contained under Article IV (2)(a) of the Hague-
Visby Rules continues to adversely affect cargo interests.  
In the above case, the Supreme Court held that the carrier cannot rely on the 
defence where his acts amount to barratrous conduct. Prior to the Hague Rules, an 
exception for barratry was included on bills of lading. At the negotiations in 1921, it 
was rejected in order to facilitate the negotiated compromise between ship-owners 
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and cargo owners.250 The text of the Hague-Visby Rules provide an insight to the 
exclusion of barratry in the Rules. Article IV(5)(e) and Article IV bis (4) of the Hague-
Visby Rules which deal with the limitations of the Rules, state that damage with 
actual intent, barratry, is a limitation as per the Rules. The Supreme Court held that 
the post grounding actions of the Master did not constitute an act of barratry as the 
carrier admitted that the Master’s intention was alleged and that it was not alleged 
that the Master acted with intent or was reckless with the knowledge that damage 
may occur to the vessel or cargo.251 Thus, the cargo-claim failed. 
The above case, illustrates the alarmingly expansive ambit of Article IV(2)(a) of the 
Rules, even though intentional faults are excluded. The ruling in this case negatively 
impacts cargo-interests, as the case clearly demonstrates that cargo claimants 
literally have no recourse against the faults or negligence of the carrier’s personnel, 
unless they can show that the agents or servants of the carrier acted with actual 
intention to cause damage.252 This is an almost impossible task on the part of the 
claimants to prove as they are not privy to the management of the vessel or its 
navigation at sea, thus, realistically they cannot be expected to prove such. 253 
Further, there is no rational reason as to why a carrier is liable for its servants 
barratrous acts but not for acts of a lesser degree than barratry, which are also 
deemed to be serious in nature. Once again, cargo interests suffer injustice as a 
result of more favourable conditions in the Rules for the carrier.   
4.5 Conclusion 
Despite its mounting notoriety over the years, carriers’ reliance on the defence of 
negligent navigation defence has been an integral part of the rules governing the 
carriage of goods by sea. Even in contracts of carriage where the Hague- Visby 
Rules are not utilised as the governing law, it has become standard practice for 
carriers to incorporate the defence of negligent navigation by way of an express 
provision or by virtue of a clause paramount into the bill of lading or charterparty 
agreement. 
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Recent attempts to remove the defence in the Hamburg Rules and the Rotterdam 
Rules, have failed and this defence in favour of the carrier, continues to be relied 
upon to the detriment of cargo interests. 254 As illustrated in some of the above 
discussed judgements, errors pertaining to the defence, namely, errors in the 
navigation and management of the vessel become contentious issues across 
jurisdictions.  
The wording of Article IV (2)(a) of the Hague-Visby Rules, is perceived to be an 
allocation of risk in favour of the carrier. Critics of the Hague-Visby Rules argue that 
this evidences the inability of the Rules to adapt to the needs of a modern maritime 
industry. Furthermore, it places cargo interests in a vulnerable position with a 
burdensome onus to discharge and little protection in a cargo claim.  
This defence in favour of the carrier is entrenched in the current Rules governing the 
carriage of goods by sea applicable in the majority of maritime trading nations. 
However, there appears to be growing international consensus that measures have 
to be taken to eliminate the defence in order to create a more equitable balance in 
the interests of ship-owners and cargo-owners. The need for uniformity in the laws 
regulating carriage of goods by sea is an ongoing debate and it would not be 
unreasonable to predict that the provision contained in Article IV (2)(a) of the Hague-
Visby Rules will either be modified or removed all together in the future, in order to 
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CHAPTER 5: THE DEFENCE OF FIRE 
5.1 Introduction 
Fires at sea, have proven to be amongst the most dangerous perils that a vessel 
may encounter, due to the trail of destruction it leaves in its wake and the colossal 
risk it poses to life and property at sea. The peril of fire has a widespread effect on all 
the parties involved in the carriage of goods by sea, namely, the ship-owner, the 
carrier or charterer, the cargo-owner, and the insurers including P & I Clubs. Losses 
that the carrier incurs include losses in fighting the fire, repairs to the vessel and 
bringing the vessel into a port of safety. The cargo-owner and insurer incur losses in 
respect of the damaged cargo and general average contribution claims.  
Carriers’ continue to rely on the defence of fire due to their limited means at sea to 
battle and contain the blaze. The risk of fires at sea, has increased exponentially due 
to the carriage of containerised cargo by sea. Carriers engaged in shipping 
containerised cargo run the risk of having such cargo being misdeclared, as they are 
dependent on the declaration given by the shipper. Hazardous or flammable cargo 
are often misdeclared as these types of cargo attract higher freight and insurance 
rates. Hazardous and flammable cargo require proper care and stringent 
requirements as to how such cargo is to be stowed and carried. Often safety 
provisions have to be made by the carrier when such cargo is carried aboard which 
results in higher freight rates being levied. Without the proper equipment and 
informed expert personnel required for the shipment of flammable cargo, the vessel 
and its crew are placed in a dangerous and life-threatening position should a fire 
occur at sea. 
The exception of fire, as contained in the Hague-Visby originated as a common law 
exception that was later codified in a number of English fire statutes. The English 
Merchant Shipping Act of 1894255 consolidated the liability of the carrier by dealing 
with exclusions of liability and limitations of the carrier.256 The defence is aimed at 
protecting the carrier even in the modern era of maritime trade.  
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5.2. The Definition and Scope of Article IV(2)(b) o f the Hague-Visby Rules 
The defence of fire is contained in Article IV (2)(b) of the Hague-Visby Rules.  
Article IV Rule 2: 
‘Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or 
resulting from- 
Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier.’257 
The Hague-Visby defence of fire allows the carrier to escape liability for loss or 
damage to cargo that arose or resulted from fire, unless caused by the actual, 
personal fault of the carrier. As a result, whilst the carrier is not liable for fire damage 
or loss resulting from the negligent conduct of its servants or agents, whose acts the 
carrier would otherwise be vicariously liable for, the carrier will not be able to rely on 
the protection of the defence if it is at fault personally.258 The determination of the 
presence or absence of personal fault will have to be taken in light of all facts and 
circumstances of the case in question. 
5.2.1 ‘Fire’ 
The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English defines fire as ‘a 
process in which substances combine chemically with oxygen from the air and 
typically give out bright light, heat, and smoke; combustion or burning’.259 In light of 
the Hague-Visby Rules, ‘fire’ is interpreted narrowly.260 Therefore for the defence to 
be applicable there has to be an actual flame, mere smoke or heat will not constitute 
a fire.  In the case of Tempus Shipping Co. v Louis Dreyfus,261 it was held that heat 
damage which did not result from incandescence, ignition or flames does not 
constitute damage caused by fire.262  Fire damage includes smoke damage and 
water damage sustained in the labour of putting out the fire.263 Cargo claims as a 
result of explosions onboard, attract greater scrutiny by the admiralty courts. The first 
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clear-cut argument is that an explosion resulting from combustion would fall under 
the ambit of ‘fire’. This would be accurate where there is a flame or incandescence 
and this will also include the resulting production or expansion of gases which would 
ultimately cause the damage.264 The opposing argument is that in order to fall within 
the ambit of ‘fire’, the explosion has to be more than a momentary ignition and must 
be of a negligible duration to constitute a ‘fire’.265 Therefore, explosions produced by 
over-pressurised boilers and explosions resulting from chemical reactions without a 
flame or light will not fall within the ambit of ‘fire’ as contained in the Hague-Visby 
Rules.266 
5.2.2 ‘unless, caused by the actual fault or privit y’ 
In order for the carrier to rely on the defence of fire, the fire cannot be caused due to 
the fault or privity of the carrier. The expression ‘actual fault or privity of the carrier’ is 
indicative of fault being directly attributable to the ship-owner. The expression has 
been derived from numerous English statutes and also referenced in US legislation. 
It is important to identify any individuals who may be identified or included as the 
carrier. Where the ship-owner is a corporation, liability is attributable to the 
personality of the corporation, the alter-ego.267 Therefore, liability would be attributed 
to the board of directors and senior management, persons who are directing the 
mind and will of the corporation.268 
‘Fault’ constitutes negligence and reckless acts or omissions, while ‘privity’ denotes 
knowledge, actual or ‘blind-eye knowledge’ of the acts or omissions of others.269 
‘Blind eye knowledge’ would include circumstances where the carrier deliberately 
failed to inquire as to the acts or more particularly the omissions of others which 
resulted in the fire.270 In the case of The Sea Star,271 it was held that in the absence 
of actual knowledge, the ‘privity’ of the person concerned will only be proven once it 
is shown that the said person deliberately failed to inquire as to the act or omission 
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‘in the hope that by his lack of inquiry he will not know for certain what the situation 
is.’272 
In the case of The Apostolis,273 it was held that the burden of proving fault or privity 
for purposes of the Hague-Visby Rules rests with the person asserting it, usually the 
cargo interests in the matter.274 
Whilst a ship-owner is not liable for the faults or omissions of its employees, agents 
or sub-contractors, through delegation of its duties to a third party, the ship-owner 
will not be able to escape liability for the third party’s defaults.275 Recent case law276 
suggests that ship-owners are now exercising more supervision on the activities of 
their Master and crew than before, ensuring that Masters are performing their duties 
with care and expertise. In such cases the failure to render adequate supervision 
may amount to actual fault or privity on the part of the ship-owner, leaving the ship-
owner without the protection of the defence of fire.277 Due to the limited means of a 
vessel being able to fight fires at sea, ship-owners have become more conscientious 
about training their crew members in fire-fighting procedures and regulations to be 
followed in the event of a fire at sea.  Furthermore, ship-owners are actively involving 
themselves in the exercise of due diligence so as to minimise exorbitant insurance 
and cargo claims in the event of a fire. 
5.2.3 The Scope of Article IV (2)(b) of the Hague-V isby Rules 
A carrier relying on Article IV (2)(b) of the Hague-Visby Rules, will need to first 
establish the actual cause of the loss and that he exercised due diligence before he 
will be afforded the protection under the defence of fire. 278  Once these two 
requirements have been satisfied, the carrier needs to prove that the fire was the 
actual cause of the loss or damage.  
As explained above, in order to prevent a ship-owner from relying on the fire 
defence, it must be proven that the claim arose as a result of the fault or privity of the 
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274 Ibid at 483. 
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ship-owner personally. There must be a direct link between the ship-owner, the 
cause of the fire, and the loss or damage that has occurred.279 While the carrier is 
not liable for the actions of its crew in the starting of a fire, the carrier has a duty to 
exercise due diligence in employing competent crew to deal with the peril of fire.  
In the case of Maxine Footwear Co Ltd v Canadian Government Merchant Marine 
Ltd,280 it was held that the first base obligation to exercise due diligence contained in 
Article III (1) of the Hague-Visby Rules, is an overriding obligation, irrespective of the 
exceptions contained in Article IV (2) of the Rules.281 
Article III Rule 1: 
‘The Carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the voyage to exercise 
due diligence to- 
(a) make the ship seaworthy; 
(b) properly man, equip and supply the ship; and 
(c) make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts of the 
ship in which goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage 
and preservation.’282 
Courts needs to ensure that the due diligence by the carrier has been exercised in 
respect of seaworthiness and the provisions listed above, before the carrier can rely 
on the defence of fire. In the case of Sunkist Growers Inc. v Adelaide Shipping Lines 
Ltd,283 the Ninth Circuit Court held that the carrier must have exercised due diligence 
in making the vessel seaworthy as per Article III (1) of the Hague-Visby Rules, 
before the carrier may rely on the immunity of fire.284 The carrier will be absolved 
from responsibility for a claim, where the cause of the fire cannot be determined or 
established.285 This will result in cargo-owners being unable to prove actual fault and 
carriers’ being able to escape liability easily.  
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5.3 The Fire Statutes 
The US and the United Kingdom both have national statutes regulating the defence 
of fire that a carrier can rely on in a cargo claim.  These statutes have been in 
existence prior to the Hague-Visby Rules. The fire statutes continue to co-exist with 
the fire exception contained in these jurisdictions’ version of the Hague-Visby Rules, 
and these statutes continue to be invoked by carriers in the US and the United 
Kingdom. The Fire Statutes read as follows: 
The United States Fire Statute: 
The Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 (46 U.S. Code, s 182, R.S. 4282)286 states that, 
‘No owner of any vessel shall be liable to answer for or make good to any 
person any loss or damage, which may happen to any merchandise 
whatsoever, which shall be shipped, taken in, or put on board any such 
vessel, by reason or by means of any fire happening to or on board any such 
vessel, unless such fire is caused by the design or neglect of such owner.’287 
British Fire Statute: 
Section 502 of The Merchant Shipping Act of 1894288 states that; 
 ‘The owner of a British sea-going ship or any share therein, shall not be liable 
to make good to any extent whatever any loss or damage happening without 
his actual fault or privity in the following cases; namely; -  
(1) where any goods, merchandise or other things whatsoever taken in 
or put on board his ship are lost or damaged by reason of fire on 
board the ship…’289 
Section 502 of The Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 must be read with The Merchant 
Shipping (Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act of 1958, which extends the 
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owner’s benefit to ‘any charter and any person interested or in possession of the 
ship, and in particular, any manager or operator of the ship.’290 
The United States of America enacted the Hague Rules into their domestic 
legislation though The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (46 U.S. Code, s307).291 
Tetley states that both the British and United States Fire Statutes apply even when 
the Hague-Visby Rules are in force.292 
5.3.1 Differences between Article IV(2)(b) of the H ague-Visby Rules and The 
Fire Statutes 
The Fire Statutes originated almost a century prior to the advent of the Hague- Visby 
Rules. The codification of the defences under the Rules drew strongly from historical 
maritime statutes and legislation and the defence of fire is no exception. However, 
there are a number of differences between the Rules and the Fire Statutes. 
The first and most glaring difference is that the Rules protect the ‘carrier.’ The term 
‘carrier’ extends to include the charterer as well as the owner of the vessel.293 The 
US Fire Statute only protects the ‘owner’ of the vessel.294 The term ‘owner’ extends 
to include bareboat or demise charterers; however time charterers are excluded from 
limiting their liability. 295  Where a vessel is owned by the United States, the 
government will be regarded as the ‘owner’ of the vessel in terms of the US Fire 
Statute.296 When litigating a cargo claim pertaining to the defence fire, in the United 
States, it would be an easier option for the carrier to invoke the defence under the 
US COGSA, as the ‘carrier’ is protected.  
The US and British Fire Statues only cover US and British vessels, while the Hague-
Visby Rules, cover all ships irrespective of nationality.297 
The wording of the Fire Statutes suggests that they apply before loading and after 
discharge, as the Statutes refer to fires on board a vessel and extends to cover loss 
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or damage to cargo by reason of fire, not necessarily on board the vessel at the 
time.298 In a similar situation, The Hague-Visby Rules would not be available to the 
carrier as the cargo would have already been discharged in terms of Article I (e) of 
the Rules.  
Under the Hague-Visby Rules, lack in the exercise of due diligence in making a 
vessel seaworthy by the agents or servants of the carrier is imputed to the carrier 
itself. However, under the Fire Statutes, both the charterer and the owner under 
British law and the owner under US law will only be liable if they contributed 
personally to the unseaworthiness of the vessel.299 In the case of Maxine Footwear 
Co Ltd v Canadian Government Merchant Marine Ltd,300 provisions of the Canadian 
Water Carriage of Goods Act of 1936301 were applied. The Privy Court held that due 
to the servants of the carrier not exercising due diligence in making the vessel 
seaworthy, before and during the voyage, the carrier is liable for fire damage.302 If 
the same case was adjudicated upon under the British or US Fire Statutes, the 
judgment might be different, as the Fire Statutes do not contain any reference to the 
exercise of due diligence in making a vessel seaworthy.303 This is evidenced in the 
US case, Consumers Import Co v Kawasaki Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha (The Venice 
Maru),304 where the court found that due diligence had not been exercised by the 
servants of the owner of the vessel in respect its seaworthiness. A highly flammable 
cargo of sardine meal caught fire due to improper stowage. The court further held 
that the carrier could invoke the Fire Statute, as the carrier had delegated the 
supervision of the stowage of the cargo and neglect in the exercise of due diligence 
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5.3.2 Reconciliation of The Fire Statutes with The Hague-Visby Rules 
In an effort to reconcile the issue of who is deemed to be the ‘carrier’ in terms of the 
US Fire Statute and US COGSA, judges in the case of The Edmund Fanning,306 
decided to extend the definition of the term ‘carrier’ to include servants and agents of 
the carrier. In this case, the court held that an expeditor, whose main duty was to 
provide assistance in the stowage of the cargo, was a managerial agent, as the 
expeditor’s privity and knowledge of dangerous cargo was deemed to be the privity 
of the owner under the US Fire Statute and of the carrier under US COGSA.307 
Under the US Fire Statute, the burden of proof falls upon the cargo owner308 and 
upon the carrier under the British Fire Statute.309 This stance is surprising as Britain 
is considered to be a major ship-owning nation and it has surprisingly favoured the 
cargo claimant in this instance. Under the Hague-Visby Rules, the burden of proof in 
establishing actual fault or privity falls upon the cargo claimant, as he who asserts, 
must prove. This was held in the case of The Apostolis310 and has been considered 
as the correct approach by maritime scholars. Furthermore, courts, in general, are 
reluctant to burden a litigant with a negative onus, an onus requiring either party to 
show that it was not in actual fault or privity.311 In a cargo claim, the carrier must first 
assert and prove the exception of fire, the cargo claimant must then go on to allege 
and prove the carrier’s actual fault or privity.312 
Maritime scholars313 have maintained that the Fire Statutes are no longer a necessity 
in modern maritime law as the Hague-Visby Rules have been enacted into the 
domestic legislation of both the United States and the United Kingdom, and majority 
the major maritime trading nations. By maritime courts encouraging the application 
and enforcement of the Hague-Visby Rules in cargo claims relating to the exception 
of fire, uniformity in application of the Rules will be achieved and there would be an 
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increase in jurisprudence of the Hague-Visby Rules which would benefit both the 
carrier and the cargo-owner in future claims. 
5.4 Issues Pertaining to The Defence of Fire 
There are a number of issues which may arise when the defence of fire is invoked in 
a cargo claim, These included but are not limited to, the care of the cargo once a fire 
has started; any deviations made by the vessel during a fire and the right to claim 
general average in a cargo claim involving fire. These issues will be briefly discussed 
below. 
5.4.1 Cargo Care in the Peril of Fire 
Once the peril of fire has been discovered on a vessel, the carrier may be held 
responsible if it is negligent in extinguishing the blaze. There are two US cases that 
entrench this view. In the case of American Mail v Tokyo M. & F. Insurance 
Company, 314  the court held that negligence in the extinguishing of a fire is 
negligence in the care and the custody of the cargo.315 In the case of Asbestos 
Corporation. Et al. v Cyprien Fabre,316 a fire which was not caused by the negligence 
of the carrier, started in the engine room of the vessel and spread to the cargo holds 
a few hours later. The carrier could not extinguish the fire as all the fire-fighting 
equipment was located and controlled from the engine room of the vessel. This 
resulted in widespread fire damage to the vessel and its cargo. The US Court of 
Appeals held that the carrier was responsible for the cargo damage, as carriers are 
exempt from liability for cargo damage caused by fire, except when the fire is 
‘caused by the design or neglect of such owner’ or ‘caused by the actual fault or 
privity of the carrier.’ These two phrases essentially have the same meaning and are 
often used interchangeably.317  
These two cases clearly illustrate that the fire exception, where the carrier is exempt 
from liability will apply, unless it can be proven that the fire and damage caused 
thereof, arose as a result of the negligence and/ or fault of the carrier. Even if the fire 
arose due to reasons that cannot be attributed to the carrier, it is the carrier’s duty to 
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mitigate damage and the carrier can be held responsible for any damage that can be 
shown to have occurred due to the carrier not satisfactorily mitigating such damage. 
5.4.2 Deviation and the Peril of Fire 
The defence of fire may not be available to a carrier whose vessel had deviated from 
its contracted path of voyage. In the case of Thiess Brothers (Queensland) Pty Ltd v 
Australian Steamships Pty Ltd,318 loss was caused as a result of a fire breaking out 
in a shipment of coal that was being carried from Gladstone to Melbourne. During 
the voyage, the vessel deviated to Newcastle, situated in New South Wales in order 
to bunker for the next stage of the voyage. The vessel experienced a delay in 
Newcastle that resulted in the coal heating up. The master deemed the heating of 
the coal to be of a serious nature and decided to discharge the cargo. During the 
course of discharge, the coal caught alight and had to be sold at the quayside as it 
lay. The court held that the vessel had deviated for its sole benefit and that the 
deviation was outside of the contracted voyage, this led to the contract of carriage 
being abrogated and therefore, the carrier was not entitled to rely on the defence of 
fire as contained under Article IV (2)(b) of the Rules.319 The reasoning of the court is 
considered as correct as the deviation was not justified through the construction of 
the contract of carriage and as a result the carrier was liable for the loss and damage 
sustained by the cargo-owner. 
5.4.3 General Average in a Fire Claim 
General average is a complex subject which does not fall within the ambit of this 
study. However, when discussing the exception of fire, the subject of general 
average is important to touch on. Maritime scholar Astle320 describes the doctrine of 
general average below: 
‘If a ship and cargo are exposed to a common danger of damage or 
destruction, and if, in order to avert that danger, some part of the cargo of the 
ship or her appurtenances is deliberately abandoned or damaged or 
destroyed, the losses caused are regarded as a general average sacrifice, 
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and are to some extent made good by contribution in general average by the 
ship and the cargo as a whole.’321 
The Hague-Visby Rules do not contain any express provision pertaining to general 
average however, Article V of the Rules allows for the insertion of any lawful 
provision regarding general average into a bill of lading. Therefore, if the cargo 
claimant is unable to recover his losses for fire damage under the Rules, there are 
other means of redress, namely general average. The cargo claimant can claim 
general average after the peril of fire, when an act has been carried out by the carrier 
to save the cargo or vessel and put out the fire which resulted in the damage or loss 
of cargo.322 In the case of Starlight Trading v San Francisco Maru,323 carbon dioxide 
was injected into a cargo hold and its hatches were then sealed in order to fight a 
fire. The cargo was subjected to a smoke-filled atmosphere for 42 hours, which 
resulted in cargo damage. The US Court of Appeals held that the cargo damage was 
a general average loss.324 
In February 2017, a fire broke out in a cargo hold on the mv APL Austria, a 
containership, which was 30 nautical miles west of the coast of Port Elizabeth, South 
Africa.325 The vessel entered the harbour of Nqura, at Port Elizabeth, where local 
fire-fighting units and representatives of the carrier spent a number of days 
extinguishing the blaze. As a result of the fire, the cargo-owners and their insurers 
suffered significant loss from the damage to the cargo, delays and general average 
contributions.326 The carrier also experienced monetary loss as there was substantial 
damage to the vessel and the carrier had to cover the costs of having to tranship the 
cargo to Cape Town and various other destinations in West Africa.327  
In the above-mentioned cases, the loss and damage sustained by both the cargo-
owner and carrier was as a result of the action taken by the carrier to avert danger to 
both the cargo and the vessel.  These two cases clearly illustrate how the doctrine of 
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general average works in a cargo claim pertaining to fire damage, in order to 
establish fairness in the financial burden to be borne by both parties. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Justification for reliance on the fire exception is that the peril of fire is one of the 
greatest dangers that a vessel could ever face, and which may result in 
insurmountable damage and destruction including loss of life. As a result of the 
pertinent reasons, as highlighted in this chapter, this defence has always been a 
significant one in the history of maritime trade and has been utilised as immunity 
long before the Hague-Visby Rules were adopted. The Fire Statutes of the United 
States and the United Kingdom gave the exception special status and both these 
statutes were legislated prior to the enactment of the Rules and continue to be used 
in adjudicating cargo claims today. 
Article IV (2)(b) of the Hague-Visby Rules clearly defines the exception by stating 
that the defence of fire allows the carrier to escape liability for loss or damage to 
cargo that arose or resulted from fire, unless caused by the actual, personal fault of 
the carrier.  
In order to recover for losses or damage, the cargo-claimant needs to show that 
there was a lack of due diligence of the ship-owner to make the vessel seaworthy or 
safe to receive, stow and discharge the cargo. As the ship-owner is not liable for an 
act or omission by the crew or servants, where there is a fire that was caused by the 
negligence of the crew or servants, the exception would stand as a complete 
defence for the ship-owner. The ship-owner would only be liable if the cargo claimant 
can show lack of due diligence on the part of the ship-owner personally.  
Examples of lack of due diligence on the part of the carrier would include a lack of 
adequate fire-fighting measures or a lack of training or competent guidance for the 
crew. A cargo claimant would also be successful in the claim if it can be show that 
the carrier failed to safely stow dangerous or hazardous cargo. The carrier will need 
to show compliance with general fire safety requirements as well as the safety 
measures of the ISM Code, as evidence to rebut the averment of unseaworthiness. 
Regular fire drills, fire-fighting equipment checks and current information and 
procedures regarding hazardous and flammable cargo would suffice as evidence 
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that the carrier must put forth in a fire damage claim. It is of utmost importance that 
carriers equip their vessels with the latest fire-fighting technology and train their crew 
in efficient and effective fire-fighting tactics in order to minimise the risk of loss of life 
and cargo at sea.   
 The case law discussed in this chapter clearly illustrates the litigious nature of the 
exception of fire. Fires at sea continue to pose as a highly dangerous risk to maritime 
transportation that gives rise to long-winded and complex claims for loss and 
damage to cargo. Claims involving the defence of fire often result in expensive 
litigation and even where the cargo-claimant may be successful in the claim, the 
‘guilty’ carrier may be a brass plate company with little to no assets to satisfy claims 


















CHAPTER 6: THE DEFENCE OF HEAVY WEATHER AS A PERIL OF THE 
SEAS 
6.1 Introduction 
The defence of heavy weather as a peril of the seas arose as a contentious defence 
when it was first codified in Rhodian law; by exempting the master of the vessel from 
liability in the contract of carriage of goods if the vessel became unnavigable due to 
perils of the sea.328 In the same vein, the Hague-Visby Rules and the Rotterdam 
Rules contain clauses exempting the carrier from liability for damage caused by 
perils of the seas. This ocean specific defence,329 has been constant in wording and 
substance in its application to vessels carrying cargo on the high seas and exposed 
to perils of the sea. This particular exception is also commonly referred to as the 
‘heavy weather defence’ as it applies to claims arising out of accidents caused due 
to heavy weather conditions out at sea.  
The heavy weather defence continues to remain relevant due to the frequency of 
perils, dangers and accidents of the seas. Such perils and dangers, may result in the 
damage and/ or loss of cargo, as well as damage to the vessel itself, thereby 
affecting both the carrier and the cargo-owner. Both parties can suffer substantial 
losses and this defence is known to be one of the most litigated of the Hague-Visby 
defences. When contemplating the heavy weather defence, there are a number of 
factors that need to be considered, including the obligation of seaworthiness and due 
diligence. These factors will be discussed later on in this chapter.  
The heavy weather exception can be found in all standard charter forms as a listed 
exception. It can be worded simply as ‘perils of the sea’ or extend to the further 
encompassing ‘all dangers of the sea, rivers and navigation.’330 The Hague-Visby 
Rules extends coverage to a sea carrier on the high seas as well as a carrier 
voyaging through inland navigable waters. This may include rivers, canals and lakes.  
 
328 M Katsivela ‘The Treatment of The Sea Peril Exception of The Hague-Visby Rules in Common Law and Civil 
Law Jurisdictions’ (2017) 1 WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs 19.  
329 In the case of Thames & Mersey Marine Insurance Co Ltd v Hamilton, Fraser & Co (The Inchmaree) [1887] 
12 AC 484, it was held dangers only specific to the sea will fall under the exception. 
330 ‘New York Produce Exchange Form 2015’ (3 June 2015), available at https://www.bimco.org/-
/media/BIMCO/Contracts-and-Clauses/Contracts/Sample-copies/Sample-copy-NYPE-2015.ashx, accessed on 
27 November 2019.  
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6.2. The Definition and Scope of Article IV(2)(c) o f the Hague-Visby Rules 
The defence of heavy weather as a peril of the seas is contained in Article IV(2)(c) of 
the Hague-Visby Rules. 
Article IV Rule 2:  
‘Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage 
arising from or resulting from-  
 Perils, dangers, and accidents of the sea or other navigable waters.’331 
6.2.1 The Definition of Article IV(2)(c) of the Hag ue-Visby Rules 
The Hague-Visby defence of heavy weather exempts the sea carrier from liability for 
loss or damage in the event of a peril, danger or accident of the sea. These events, 
sea peril; dangers and accidents of the sea are not further defined by the Hague-
Visby Rules, neither are these events statutorily defined in any conventions or 
domestic legislation. In order to determine whether an incident falls under this 
exception, case law from various maritime jurisdictions would need to be considered 
in order to reach a conclusion. However, this may prove problematic as there are 
divergent judicial interpretations of this exception in the various maritime 
jurisdictions, namely, Australia, the US and the United Kingdom. Therefore, the 
writer will attempt to narrow down the definition of this exception by discussing the 
interpretations of different jurisdictions under separate subheadings dealing with 
different elements of this exception.  
6.2.2 The Scope of Article IV(2)(c) of The Hague-Vi sby Rules 
Wilson, offers a number of examples of events that fall under the heavy weather 
defence.332 These include but are not limited to: a vessel running aground in fog, a 
vessel driven onto rocks in a gale storm and collisions with other vessels during 
storms.333 It is important to note that the carrier may also invoke this defence to 
cover for loss or damage arising from actions taken to avoid or counteract a peril of 
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the seas.334 In the case of Canada Rice Mills v Union Marine Insurance,335 it was 
held that the cargo of rice which suffered heat damage was as a result of the actions 
taken by the carrier in trying to counteract the incursion of sea water during a 
storm.336 The carrier was able to successfully rely on the heavy weather defence as 
the damage to the cargo was as a result of the consequence of trying to avoid the 
sea peril. 
When dealing with the defence of heavy weather, the maritime concepts of 
seaworthiness and due diligence need to be considered, as these two concepts are 
of value in the study of this defence.337 
In a cargo claim arising from the damage caused through perils of the seas, the 
carrier will have to satisfy the initial obligation as contained under Article III (1) and 
(2) of the Hague-Visby Rules before invoking the exception. This is an overriding 
obligation, irrespective of the exceptions contained under Article IV(2) of the Rules. 
Article III of the Rules states that the carrier is to exercise due diligence before and 
at the beginning of the voyage in making the vessel seaworthy. The carrier further 
has to man, equip and supply the vessel as well as properly and carefully stow, load, 
handle and discharge the cargo.  
Article IV (1) of the Rules entrenches the initial obligation by stating that, 
‘Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be liable for loss or damage arising or 
resulting from unseaworthiness unless caused by want of due diligence on the 
part of the carrier to make the ship seaworthy, and to secure that the ship is 
properly manned, equipped and suppled, and to make the holds, refrigerating 
and cool chambers and all other party of the ship in which goods are carried 
fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation in accordance with 
the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article III. Whenever the loss or damage has 
resulted from unseaworthiness the burden of proving the exercise of due 
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diligence shall be on the carrier or other person claiming exemption under this 
article.’338 
The above provision clearly states that the carrier’s success on its reliance on the 
Hague-Visby exceptions, will be dependent on whether it exercised due diligence in 
making the vessel seaworthy and the burden of proving such shall be on the carrier. 
Once the carrier is able to prove such due diligence was exercised, the exceptions 
become readily available for its defence.  
Thus, if a vessel that is seaworthy and cargo-worthy, sustains damage to the vessel 
itself and loss of its cargo overboard during a storm at sea, the carrier or ship-owner 
shall be able to invoke and succeed on the heavy weather defence as the vessel 
was in good condition and the goods were properly secured. However, as it will be 
discussed below, certain jurisdictions apply a stricter interpretation of this exception 
compared to others, and do not permit the carrier to succeed in easily avoiding 
liability on the basis of this exception. 
There are two elements that need to be taken in to account when deciding if a 
particular event amounts to a peril of the seas. The first element being the factual 
considerations such as the construction of the vessel and the nature of the event. 
These factual indications are non-exhaustive and case dependant.339 The second 
element relates to whether the event was foreseeable This element is often one of 
the most contentious factors to prove in a cargo claim. These elements will be 
discussed in greater detail further in this chapter.  
6.2.2.1 Seaworthiness 
There is no special requirement for a vessel to be in perfect condition, therefore the 
carrier need only exercise due diligence to equip the vessel to withstand the perils of 
the sea voyage. Carver, explains that the vessel needs to be fit to sail voyage 
contemplated by the parties and be suitable to carry the cargo through the 
voyage.340  
 
338 Article IV (1) of the Hague-Visby Rules. 
339 N J Margetson The system of liability of Articles III and IV of the Hague (Visby) Rules (published PhD thesis, 
University of Amsterdam, 2008) 138. 
340 G H Treitel & F M B Reynolds Carver on Bills of Lading 2 ed (2005) at 501-502. 
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In order to properly examine the different interpretations of the heavy weather 
defence, it is essential to provide a brief analysis of the various judicial 
interpretations of seaworthiness. The term ‘seaworthy’ is not defined in the Hague-
Visby Rules. Definitions of this particular term have been coined by various 
academics and judges in maritime texts and case law. As a brief introduction to the 
concept of seaworthiness, listed below are three definitions from the jurisdictions of 
Britain, the US and Australia.  
6.2.2.2 The United Kingdom 
In the English case Mcfadden v Blue Star Line,341 the court citing Carver, defined 
seaworthiness as a degree of fitness which an ordinary and careful owner would 
exercise over his vessel, at the commencement of its voyage, taking into account all 
probable circumstances of the voyage.342  
From the above we can deduce the following question when trying to determine 
seaworthiness before an English court: Was the vessel reasonably fit to encounter 
the ordinary perils that might be expected on that voyage at that time of the year? 
Hence the English standard for seaworthiness is one of reasonableness. 
6.2.2.3 The United States 
The definition for what constitutes seaworthiness is derived from case law. In the 
cases of The Sylvia 343  and The Isis, 344  it was held that in order to determine 
seaworthiness, the vessel must be reasonably fit to carry the cargo it has undertaken 
to transport. Further to this general rule, the facts of each case will need to be taken 
into consideration when determining seaworthiness.345  
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344 The Isis 290 U.S. 333, 352. 




The definition and test for seaworthiness that was applied in the Australian case of 
the Great China Metal Industries Co. Ltd. v Malaysian Shipping International 
Corporation Berhad (The Bunga Seroja),346 covers many aspects of seaworthiness, 
as well as the flexibility of the test for seaworthiness. In The Bunga Seroja, the court 
held that the carrier has to take into consideration the kinds of conditions that the 
vessel may encounter, when exercising due diligence in making the vessel 
seaworthy at the beginning of the voyage. The vessel will be deemed to be 
seaworthy if it is fit under those conditions to reach its destination safely and 
transport its cargo to the destination undamaged.347  
It was further held, that seaworthiness within the ambit of the Hague- Visby Rules 
must be considered in light of its common law meaning. A vessel shall be deemed to 
be seaworthy if it can face any weather or storm through its intended voyage.348 
Thus, when a carrier wishes to invoke the heavy weather defence in an Australian 
court, it will have to prove that that it exercised due diligence at the beginning of the 
voyage in making the vessel seaworthy in light of any anticipated weather conditions 
that the vessel may encounter during the journey.  
In The Bunga Seroja, the court concluded that the test for seaworthiness is one of 
flexibility.349 The carrier, when exercising due diligence as per the responsibilities 
contained under Article II) (1) and (2) of the Rules, will need to take into account the 
voyage itself and the conditions that the vessel may encounter. Hence, the due 
diligence to be exercised in each case will vary. 
The decision taken by court in the Bunga Seroja, has been criticised by many 
academics as in its simplest form, the court held that if a vessel is seaworthy, then 
the carrier has already discharged its duty and cannot be held liable for what was 
reasonably foreseeable, predictable weather at the time of the voyage. This decision 
goes further than that taken by English courts, where there has to be an element of 
 
346 Great China Metal Industries Co. Ltd. v Malaysian Shipping International Corporation Berhad (The Bunga 
Seroja), [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 512. 
347 Ibid at point 33. 
348 Ibid at point 86. 
349 Ibid at point 35. 
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fortuity in the peril. Australian courts have disregarded the element of fortuity,350 
making it easier for carriers to rely on this defence even in predictable weather. The 
Australian stance favours the carrier, in that it has been argued by many of its 
supporters that the decision taken in the Bunga Seroja, now represents the position 
of the defence under all common law jurisdictions. 351  On the other end of the 
spectrum is the more stringent approach taken by US court, insisting that the event 
has to be unforeseeable and extraordinary in nature in order for the exception to be 
relied upon by the carrier.352 These interpretations will be discussed in greater detail 
hereunder. 
From the case law discussed above, it is clear that the various jurisdictions 
unanimously agree that the standard for seaworthiness is one of reasonableness. 
The question to be posed by maritime courts in a cargo claim will be: Was the 
standard of the due diligence exercised in making the vessel seaworthy one of 
reasonableness? There are a number of considerations that need to be considered 
when determining the seaworthiness of a vessel, these include the ports of 
destination and departure, nature of the cargo and the class of the vessel.   
6.3 The Interpretation of the Heavy Weather Defence  Under Various 
Jurisdictions 
6.3.1 English Law 
Since there is no exact definition of the exception, English law places reliance on the 
elements of un-foreseeabilty and the extraordinary nature of the events in deciding if 
the incident falls within the ambit of the exception. 
In the case of Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co Ltd v Hamilton, Fraser & Co 
(The Inchmaree), the court held that a rigid definition of the expression ‘perils of the 
sea’ should be avoided.353 English courts continue to follow this sentiment when 
 
350 M Hartwell, A Robinson & P Lamb ‘Heavy Weather, the Carriage Regimes and Notes of Protest’ Norton Rose 
Fulbright South Africa August 2014 at 2, available at 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/119814/heavy-weather-the-carriage-regimes-
brand-notes-of-protest, accessed on 7 July 2015. 
351 Ibid. 
352 Ibid. 
353 Thames & Mersey Marine Insurance Co Ltd v Hamilton, Fraser & Co (The Inchmaree) [1887] 12 AC 484. 
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deliberating on the exception and examine the incident in terms of foreseeability and 
the carrier’s ability to avoid the effects of the incident.  
6.3.1.1 The Requirement that the Event was Unforese eable 
Over the years there have been divergent rulings by English courts regarding the 
aspect of foreseeability pertaining to the heavy weather defence. In some cases, 
judges have ruled that the event must have been unforeseeable, while in other cases 
it was held that a foreseeable event would still result in the carrier being able to rely 
on the defence. In order to reach a conclusion as to how English courts in general 
treat this particular element of the exception, various English cases will be examined 
below. 
In the three cases discussed below, the court held that in order to rely on the 
defence, the event must have been unforeseeable and unanticipated. 
In the case of Balli Trading Ltd. v Afalona Shipping Co. Ltd. (The Coral),354 cargo 
collapsed during the voyage as a result of negligent stowage. It was held that the 
damage was as a result of the negligent stowage and therefore, the event was 
foreseeable and the defence failed.355 
In the case of The Friso,356 cargo was jettisoned as the vessel encountered heavy 
weather and suffered great damage resulting in the vessel finally being abandoned. 
The court found that the vessel was unseaworthy at the beginning of the voyage and 
therefore, the carrier could not rely on the defence as the event was foreseeable due 
to the lack of due diligence exercised in making the vessel seaworthy.  
In the case of Aktiselskabet de Banske Sukkerfabrikker v Bajamar Compania 
Naviera S.A. (The Torenia),357 loss was suffered as a result of the vessel sinking in 
heavy weather together with its load of cargo. The court found that the vessel sank 
as it was unseaworthy and its unseaworthiness would have been discovered if due 
diligence was exercised. Therefore, the event was not unforeseeable as the carrier 
 
354 Balli Trading Ltd. v Afalona Shipping Co. Ltd. (The Coral) [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 158. 
355 Ibid. 
356 The Friso [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 469. 
357 Aktieselskabet De Danske Sukkerfabrikker v Bajamar Compania Naviera S.A. (The Torenia) [1983] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 210.  
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was negligent in the performance of its duties, making the event one that would have 
been foreseeable.   
In the cases discussed below, the courts held that the carrier can rely on the 
defence, where the events were reasonably foreseeable, provided that the loss 
suffered was fortuitous. 
The leading case in English law pertaining to foreseeability is Wilson, Sons and Co v 
Owners of the Cargo Per the Xantho (The Xantho).358 In this case, the Xantho sank 
after colliding with another vessel during heavy fog. The ship-owner averred that the 
loss was as a result of the collision which itself was a peril of the seas. The House of 
Lords agreed with this and found that the collision was in fact a peril of the seas.359  
The exception was applied in the presence of a non-extraordinary event,360 as fog at 
sea is not deemed to be an extraordinary event, but rather an event that is 
encountered often by carriers.  
In the case of Hamilton, Fraser and Co v Pandorf and Co (The Pandorf), during 
voyage, rats gnawed a hole in the pipe of the vessel leading to the ingress of 
seawater which subsequently caused damage to the cargo of rice.361 The court held 
that the event can be regarded as a sea peril as there was no negligence on the part 
of the carrier.362 Lord Macnaghten stated: 
‘Under these circumstances it seems to me that the accident which caused 
the damage was one of the excepted perils or accidents and that there is no 
reason why the shipowner should not avail himself of the exception. It was an 
accidental and unforeseen incursion of the sea that could not have been 
guarded against by the exercise of reasonable care.’363 
Judge Fitzgerald agreed with the above opinion and explained that even when an 
event is fortuitous and unforeseeable, the event does not have to be unforeseeable 
in character to constitute a peril of the seas.364 
 
358 Wilson, Sons and Co v Owners of the Cargo per the Xantho (The Xantho) (1887) 12 App Cas 503, HL. 
359 Ibid. 
360 Katisvela op cite note 328 at 21. 
361 Hamilton, Fraser and Co v Pandorf and Co (The Pandorf) [1887] 12 App Cas 518. 
362 Ibid. 
363 Ibid at 530 
364 Ibid at 528. 
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However, in an unusual twist, in case of The Tilia Gorthan, the court held that 
foreseeability of the event will not allow the carrier reliance on the defence.365 In this 
case, a cargo of timber was lost overboard as a result of heavy weather conditions 
encountered by the vessel. These included rough seas and winds in excess of 
Beaufort Force 10 in the Atlantic Ocean.366 The court held the carrier was liable for 
the damage as it stated that there was always the possibility of the vessel 
encountering heavy weather conditions, which should not have been ignored. The 
court reasoned that heavy weather conditions were not of an exceptional nature in 
the Atlantic Ocean at the time of the voyage, which was in winter. These conditions 
were to be expected on the voyage route of the vessel, hence the vessel ought to 
have been able to withstand the conditions of the event.367 
Tetley, supports the view that the event must be unforeseeable and unanticipated.368 
This view was held by the court in the cases of The Coral,369 The Friso370 and The 
Torenia, 371  as discussed above. From these cases, it is evident that the 
‘unforeseeabilty’ of the event is merely a perspective to be considered and not a 
primary element of the defence. These cases illustrate that foreseeability is a point of 
view in a case and not the deciding factor. 
Carver, supports the view that the defence can be relied upon when the event is 
reasonably foreseeable or fortuitous in nature.372 Margetson, citing Carver, explains 
that emphasis should be placed on the phrase ‘guarded against’ rather than 
‘unforeseeabilty’.373 Courts need to focus on the carrier’s ability to avoid the effects 
of the peril rather than the foreseeability of the occurrence of the peril. This has 
become a leading standard in English law, as maritime trade continues to grow, and 
carriage of goods by sea is essential in the growth of such trade. If a carrier, fearing 
liability for perils of the seas, desists from contracting to carry goods by seas, it will 
adversely affect global commercial trade. It is important to note that there are few 
events at sea that are considered to be unforeseen.  
 
365 The Tilia Gorthan (1985) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 552. 
366 Katisvela op cite note 328 at 21. 
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From the above discussion of English case law, it can be concluded that is more 
practical to absolve the carrier for liability in the presence of unforeseen sea peril 
events rather than asserting that the event be unforeseeable. Thus, English law 
appears to focus on the fortuity or chance occurrence of the event rather than its 
extraordinary character.  
6.3.1.2 The Extraordinary Nature of the Event 
As discussed above, common incidents of a voyage, such as rough seas, will 
constitute perils of the seas, even though it is not an extraordinary event, however, 
the carrier will only be able to avoid liability if it can show that due diligence was 
exercised and reasonable care was taken.374  
In the cases of The Xantho375 and The Pandorf,376 the courts applied the exception 
in the presence of non-extraordinary events, namely fog and destruction of piping by 
rodents. Examples of non-extraordinary perils include a vessel running aground on a 
sunken rock in calm waters and storms at sea which are not of exceptional force. 
It can be concluded that English law defines perils of the seas in terms of its 
foreseeability and the carrier’s ability to avoid its effects, rather than the 
extraordinary character of the event. 
6.3.2 US Law 
Under US law, emphasis is placed on the un-foreseeabilty of the event as well as the 
event constituting the sea peril being extraordinary in nature. The three cases below 
set out the stringent definition under US law.  
In the case of The Rosalia, perils of the seas were defined as: ‘something so 
catastrophic as to triumph over those safeguards by which skilful and vigilant 
seamen usually bring ship and cargo to port safely.’377  
Judge Hand in the case of The Naples Maru,378 expanded on the definition given in 
The Rosalia as follows: 
 
374 Ibid. 
375 The Torenia. 
376 Katisvela op cit note 339 at 21. 
377 The Rosalia (1920) 264 F 285 288. 
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‘The phrase ‘Perils of the sea’ has at times been treated as though its 
meaning were esoteric; Judge Hough’s vivid language in the ‘Rosalia’ has 
perhaps given currency to the notion. That meant nothing more, however, 
than that the weather encountered must be too much for a well found vessel 
to withstand.’379 
Both these cases clearly illustrate that under US law, in order for a carrier to rely on 
the defence of perils of the sea, the event in question needs to be unforeseeable as 
well as extraordinary or extreme in nature.  
6.3.2.1 The Requirement that the Event was Unforese eable 
As it has been established above, the event needs to have been unforeseeable, in 
order to be defined as a peril of the seas. In the case of Bradley Fertilizer Co v 
Lavender (The Edwin I Morrison),380  cargo was damaged due to the ingress of 
seawater through an open bilge pump. The cover of the bilge pump was allegedly 
knocked out during heavy weather. The court held that carrier had to show that the 
plate and cover was firmly fixed into place at the beginning of the voyage and that 
the plate and cover could have only be ripped out through an extraordinary event 
that could not have been reasonably anticipated.381 The court further held that the 
severity of the weather encountered by the vessel during that particular stretch of the 
voyage was to be expected in that particular area at the time.382 
In the case of Johnson v S.S. Schickshinny,383 a cargo of cotton and lumber was 
damaged as a result of the spillage of incorrectly stowed lard, during heavy weather. 
The court cited The Rosalia in its judgment and held that despite the rough weather 
and heavy seas encountered by the vessel, the carrier would not be able to rely on 
the defence if the vessel was not subjected to a greater risk than reasonably 
anticipated on the voyage.384 
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Based on the cases discussed above, it can be concluded that under US law, the 
event must be unforeseeable in order for the carrier to rely on the defence. Tetley 
and Sturley, emphasise the rigid application of the exception in US courts, pointing to 
numerous cases that illustrate this.385 Thus, a carrier litigating under US law, who 
wishes to invoke the defence of heavy weather, will have a much harder time in 
proving that the peril is an unforeseen event. The carrier stands a greater chance of 
losing his claim and defence in a US court than if he was litigating in an English or 
Australian court. 
6.3.2.2 The Extraordinary Nature of The Event 
As mentioned above, in 6.3.2. the sea peril must be of an extraordinary nature as 
was held in the case of The Rosalia386 
In the case of The Giulia,387 a cargo of hemp was damaged due to flooding which 
occurred during a storm that caused the vessel to pitch and roll violently. The 
carrier’s defence of heavy weather was dismissed, as the court found that the vessel 
was unseaworthy at the beginning of the voyage.388 The court defined sea perils as, 
‘those perils which are particular to the sea, and which are of an extraordinary nature 
or which arise from an irresistible force or overwhelming power, and which cannot be 
guarded against by the ordinary exertions of human skill and prudence.’389 
The above reiterates that the event must be extraordinary in nature. Thus, under US 
law, when an event of heavy weather results in damage, the heavy weather must be 
extraordinarily heavy weather and not just mere heavy weather.  
From the above case law, it can be concluded that under US law, for the defence of 
heavy to succeed, the sea peril must be unforeseeable, peculiar to the sea and 
extraordinary in nature. Thus, in the US, the defence of perils of the seas rarely ever 
succeeds, as it appears that US courts’ interpretation of the defence is protective of 
the cargo-owner, placing the carrier in a precarious position in this regard.  
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6.3.3  Australian Law 
There are two noteworthy Australian judgements focusing on the exception of perils 
of the sea, namely, The Bunga Seroja390 and Shipping Corp of India Ltd v Gamlen 
Chemical Co (Australasia) Pty Ltd (The Gamlen). 391  These two cases will be 
examined extensively hereunder. It is important to note that the court in the case of 
The Bunga Seroja392 extensively analysed the application of the Hague-Visby Rules 
in its judgment, making it an essential case to examine in this study. 
In the case of The Gamlen,393 a cargo of cleaning solvent was damaged due to 
heavy weather when the vessel was crossing the Great Australian Bight, which is 
notorious for severe weather. The weather conditions at the time were unusual but 
they were not unforeseeable. The carrier claimed that the damage was caused by 
the perils of the seas and invoked the exception as its defence. Upon investigation, it 
was found that the improper stowage of the solvent was the cause of the loss, thus 
the carrier was found to have breached his obligations under Article III (2) of the 
Hague-Visby Rules.394 This being the obligation to properly and carefully stow the 
cargo carried. The court rejected the carrier’s defence and held that the failure to 
properly and carefully stow the cargo, was the decisive cause of the damage and the 
carrier’s breach had to be read joint with the sea peril exception.395 The judgement 
stated, ‘It seems to us that an accurate reflection of these findings requires one to 
treat the two concurrent causes of the loss as inseparable and therefore joint.’396 
Thus the carrier’s defence of perils of the seas was dismissed. 
In respect of foreseeability of the event, the court stated that, ‘sea and weather 
conditions which may reasonable be foreseen and guarded against may constitute a 
peril of the sea.’397 The court further held that there is a difference in the construction 
of the exception of perils of the seas under US law and Anglo-Australian law.398  
 
390 The Bunga Seroja at point 33. 
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It can be deduced from the judgment of the above case that Australian courts favour 
the English approach to sea peril defence, as the event does not have to be unusual 
nor is the element of un-foreseeability required. 
In the case of The Bunga Seroja,399 a cargo of aluminium coils being shipped from 
Sydney to Taiwan was damaged during heavy weather, traversing the Great 
Australian Bight. The adverse weather was actually foreseen, as the weather 
forecast for the area warned that gale force winds as well as rough seas were to be 
expected. In actuality, the weather was much more extreme and violent as the winds 
exceeded Beaufort Force 10 and wave heights exceeded 10 metres. The cargo 
owner brought a claim for damages against the carrier alleging that the carrier had 
breached its obligations under Article III of the Hague-Visby Rules.400 The court 
found that the carrier had exercised due diligence in making the vessel seaworthy 
and carefully and properly stowed the cargo on board the vessel. It therefore 
concluded that the carrier had discharged its obligations under Article III of the Rules 
and accordingly dismissed the claim. Though the sea peril defence need not have 
been examined, the judgment went into great detail regarding its definition as well as 
its context within the ambit of the Hague-Viby Rules.  
Regarding foreseeability, the court agreed with the decision in The Gamlen, which 
held that the Anglo-Australian approach differed to that of the US approach when 
defining the sea perils defence.401 With regards to the extraordinary element of the 
defence, the court stated that, ‘in the UK and Australia, it is not necessary that the 
losses or the cause of the losses should be ‘extraordinary’. Consequently, sea and 
weather conditions which may reasonably be foreseen and guarded against may 
constitute a peril of the sea.’402 
The Gamlen and The Bunga Seroja, clearly illustrate that Australian law favours the 
English approach to the sea peril defence. In order for a carrier to rely on the 
defence, the event need not be extraordinary nor unforeseen. This is a carrier 
friendly approach to the defence considering that few perils at sea are rarely 
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unforeseen. This wide interpretation of the defence seems to be more plausible than 
the narrower, less popular approach taken under US law. 
6.3.2.1 The Requirement that the Event was Unforese eable 
In The Gamlen, the court held that a peril of the sea can be regarded as sea or 
weather conditions that may reasonably be foreseen and guarded against.  
The above finding was also agreed upon in The Bunga Seroja, where further aspects 
of the peril were discussed.  The court held that foreseeable weather conditions 
would be of importance in deciding other issues such as allegations of 
unseaworthiness or negligent navigation. Likewise, weather conditions that could 
have been guarded against may be of importance when considering these issues. 
The court reasoned that the Anglo-Australian approach ‘better reflects the history of 
the rules, their international origins and is the better construction of the rules as a 
whole.’ 403  Judge Cullinan explained that, even though there are modern 
advancements in communications and technology to reduce exposure to sea perils 
as well as more reliable methods in forecasting weather conditions, the sea peril 
exception is still relevant to the modern carrier. The primary purpose of the defence 
is to absolve the carrier from liability, especially in cases where the carrier has not 
been found guilty for lack of due diligence or fault. Judge Cullinan stated that, ‘cases 
in which the carrier has acted as expressly required by the Rules, and is not guilty of 
negligence, and, events at sea can be shown to be the causes of the loss and 
damaged, the carrier should be entitled to immunity.’404 
As examined above, all aspects and facts of the case need to be taken into account 
when contemplating the sea peril exception. Foreseeability is merely one aspect and 
certainly not the decisive factor. In order for a carrier to successfully rely on the 
defence, it would need to show it exercised due diligence in the performance of its 
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6.3.2.2 The Extraordinary Nature of The Event 
The court analysed this element under US law and disagreed with its rigid approach. 
As discussed above, under US law, as sea peril must be extraordinary or extreme in 
nature. The High Court in citing The Giulia,406  disagreed with its reasoning and 
subsequent judgement. The court held that the aspect of deciding weather 
conditions, such as intensity, can play a role in deciding whether a peril contributed 
to the damage or loss, however it not the decisive factor.407 
The above reiterates that under Australian law, the event need not be extreme or 
extraordinary in nature. An ordinary event such as rough weather or fog may 
constitute a peril of the seas.  
 In The Bunga Seroja, under Australian law, the elements of ‘foreseeability’ and 
‘extraordinary nature of the event’ are merely factors to be considered that do not 
amount to decisive factors.  Instead, all aspects of the case at hand need to be 
deliberated upon in order to ascertain if the sea peril will succeed or fail. The carrier 
will be able to rely on the defence if it has exercised due diligence in the 
performance of its duties under Article III of the Hague-Visby Rules. However, if the 
carrier has failed to exercise such diligence, and the loss or damage was as a result 
of such failure or negligence, it will not be able to rely on the defence. 
6.4 The Heavy Weather Defence in South Africa 
As discussed in Chapter 2 of this study, South Africa enacted the Hague-Visby Rules 
as a Schedule to the South African COGSA.  
As a former British colony, much of South African admiralty law, is based on English 
common law. Therefore, it follows that South African admiralty courts would look to 
English judgments when there is no relevant case law of their own. According to 
Hare, South African courts would adopt the British approach in interpreting and 
applying this defence.408  
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The defence of heavy weather as a peril of the seas, has proved to be among the 
most litigated defences listed under Article IV of the Hague-Visby Rules, owing to its 
divergent judicial interpretations. The case law discussed in this chapter, highlight 
but a few judgements in the various jurisdictions, revealing the litigious nature of this 
defence.  
The reason for the divergence in the interpretation of this defence, is due to the lack 
of clear guidance in the text of the Rules itself, concerning the definition and 
elements of the defence. It must be noted that at the initial discussions of the drafting 
of the Rules, all participants were in favour of retaining defence as a listed exception, 
however, despite this unanimous adoption, it is still subject to divergent 
interpretation.  
The two elements of the construction of the defence, namely the requirement that 
the event was unforeseeable and the extraordinary nature of the event are among 
the most contentious aspects of the sea perils defence, due to the different stances 
taken by the various jurisdictions.  
 The US approach to the defence of perils of the sea can be described as being rigid 
as the sea peril must be un-foreseeable, peculiar of the sea and extraordinary in 
nature. This place a heavy burden of proof on the carrier. As a result, carriers rarely 
end up succeeding with this defence under US law.  
It is of greater purpose to focus on the foreseeability rather than the unforeseeabilty 
of an event; and focus on the fortuity of an event rather an its extraordinary 
character, as per the Anglo-Australian approach. This approach seems to be a better 
fit for sea perils defence as it also takes into account all the aspects of the case 
when determining if the defence will succeed. 
The divergent interpretations of the heavy weather defence in different jurisdictions, 
impacts on the uniformity of the laws governing the carriage of goods by sea, 





CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction 
The Hague-Visby Rules, are considered to be among the most influential maritime 
regimes that have contributed to the development of the laws governing the carriage 
of good by sea and regulating the rights and liabilities of the parties involved. Article 
IV of the Rules contains a comprehensive list of maritime exceptions that a carrier 
may rely on to defend itself against liability in a cargo claim. Though the list is 
extensive, these exceptions are complex in their nature and application.  Each of 
these defences have specific elements that must be satisfied in order for a carrier to 
escape liability in a cargo claim based on those defences.   
Carriers are often quick to invoke defences contained in the Rules in an attempt to 
avoid liability in a cargo claim brought against them, and as illustrated in this study, 
the defences of negligent navigation, fire and heavy weather as a peril of the sea, 
have proven to be among the most contentious and heavily litigated aspects in cargo 
claims.  
7.2 The Defence of Negligent Navigation 
The first contentious defence analysed in this study was the defence of negligent 
navigation. The expansive ambit of this defence under the Rules, has resulted in it 
being a heavily litigated defence. In its simplest form, the aim of the defence is to 
provide the carrier with protection against liability for loss or damage to cargo 
resulting from errors in navigation or management of the vessel. 
 As illustrated in Chapter 2, the extensive list of errors that fall under this defence, 
easily allow the carrier to escape liability under many different scenarios. The 
wording of the defence under Article IV (2)(a) of the Rules, clearly favours the carrier 
over the cargo-owner, by allocating the risks in favour of the carrier.  This unfair 
advantage has been highlighted in court judgments in which this defence has been 
applied, offering little protection to the cargo-owner who already has a burdensome 
onus to discharge in a cargo claim. 
The technological advancements made in the area of carriage of goods by sea, 
allows the actions of the crew to be monitored and controlled by expert land-based 
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personnel and the use of such technologies has resolved the issue of the shore- 
based carrier losing control of the vessel once it departs from the port, which has 
always been the main concern justifying the birth and retention of this defence. 
The deletion of the defence in the Rotterdam Rules has proven to be futile as the 
majority of maritime trading nation have not ratified the Rotterdam Rules and carriers 
continue to rely on this defence to the detriment of cargo-owners.  Despite the 
growing concerns about its antiquity and ill-suitedness in modern carriage of goods 
by sea, the defence remains relevant due to the continued dominance of the Hague-
Visby Rules in maritime jurisdictions around the world. 
In order to bring current carriage of goods regimes in line with the needs of the 
modern shipping industry, provisions relating to this long-standing defence available 
to a carrier, must be modified or removed altogether in order to better balance the 
interests of the parties involved in a carriage of goods by sea contract. As discussed 
above, due to the dominance of the Hague-Visby Rules, it is suggested that the 
defence under the Rules be modified to balance the interests of cargo-owners by 
removing the cargo-owner’s burdensome onus to discharge negligence in a 
negligent navigation claim. This amendment would place the cargo-owner in a less 
vulnerable position and would result in an equitable balance of interests for both the 
carrier and the cargo-owner. 
7.3 The Defence of Fire 
Fires at sea is the most dangerous peril that can occur on a vessel, due to the 
colossal risk it poses to life and the cargo carried. Due to the increase in sea 
carriage of containerised cargo, the risk of fires has increased considerably. The 
reason for reliance on this defence is due to the carrier’s limited means to battle and 
contain the blaze at sea. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the Hague-Visby defence of fire allows the carrier to 
escape liability for loss or damage to cargo that arose or resulted from fire, unless 
caused by the actual, personal fault of the carrier.  As the carrier is not liable for an 
act or omission by the crew or servants, where there is a fire that was caused by the 
negligence of the crew or servants, the exception would stand as a complete 
defence for the carrier. It would only be liable if the cargo-owner can show lack of 
86 
 
due diligence on the part of the carrier personally. The additional burden of the 
carrier having to prove its lack of actual fault or privity, is the main contentious issue 
pertaining to this defence. 
The defence of fire has been firmly entrenched in maritime law even prior to the 
enactment of the Rules, as a result of the US and British Fire Statutes, which have 
been discussed in detail in Chapter 4. The Rules have merely cemented the defence 
for the continued protection of the carrier in carriage of good by sea in present times. 
As illustrated in Chapter 4, the defence of fire will continue to be invoked by carriers 
due to the unpredictable nature of fire and the insurmountable destruction it can 
cause, to both the vessel and cargo. This defence is not deemed to be as highly 
contentious as other defences discussed in this study, due to fires at sea posing 
great risks to both the carrier and the cargo-owner.  
Although the defence of fire is not as contentious as the other defences discussed, 
the defence is still a controversial and heavily litigated defence as the Hague-Visby 
Rules interpret ‘fire’ in the narrow sense of its definition and state that in order for the 
carrier to rely on the defence, the fire must not have been caused due to the actual 
fault or privity of the carrier. The controversiality of these two issues has been 
discussed extensively under Chapter 4 of this study together with the relevant case 
law. 
Carriers are continuously working on finding new ways and means to minimise the 
risk of fires at sea. It is imperative that carriers equip their vessels with the latest fire-
fighting technology and train their vessel crew in the latest fire-fighting and 
combative measures.409  Misdeclaration of containerised cargo, is at present the 
biggest cause of fires at sea. It is imperative to further address this issue in current 
and future carriage regimes in order to minimise this risk.  
7.4 The Defence of Heavy Weather as a Peril of the Seas 
The defence contained under Article IV (2)(c) of the Hague-Visby Rules is amongst 
the most controversial of the defences listed in the Rules, due to the divergent 
judicial interpretations of the defence in the various maritime jurisdictions. 
 
409 These risk management measures fall beyond the scope of the study, nevertheless it is a useful analysis as 
fires at sea are one of the most dangerous perils that can be encountered by a vessel. 
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Furthermore, due to its precarious nature, it is also one of the most highly litigated 
defences in maritime law. 
Chapter 6 of this study, discusses the strict US approach and the wider Anglo-
Australian interpretation of the two elements that make up the construction of the 
defence and highlights the lack of uniformity in the interpretation and application of 
this defence.  
The US approach to this defence is rigid and strict in its application, by defining the 
sea peril as being an event unforeseeable and extraordinary in nature. The 
burdensome onus placed on the carrier to prove such, often results in the failure of 
this defence. The Anglo-Australian approach of focussing on the foreseeability and 
fortuitousness of the event is a more apt definition and a better fit for the defence as 
illustrated in Chapter 6 of this study. 
The contentiousness of the defence is due to the lack of clear guidance in the text of 
the Rules itself. As a result, there is a need to properly address and expand the 
definition in current and future carriage of goods by sea regimes. Achieving 
uniformity in the definition of the defence will balance the interests of both the cargo-
owner and the carrier, as the Rules are thought to be advantageous to the carrier is 
a cargo claim. It is important that the definition of this exception is uniformly and 
consistently applied in all jurisdictions using the Hague-Visby Rules as their relevant 
law, in order to ensure the global harmonisation of the Rules, worldwide and to 
further ensure that case law pertaining to this defence is uniformly developed in a fair 
and consistent light. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Due to the continuous and fast-paced technological and economic advancements in 
maritime trade, there is a need for the modernisation and harmonisation of the 
international rules governing the carriage of goods by sea. The Hague-Visby Rules 
will continue being the dominant regime governing the carriage of goods by sea due 
to the unpopularity of the more modern carriage regimes such as the Rotterdam 
Rules.  
From the list of defences contained under Article IV (2) of the Hague-Visby Rules, 
the defences of negligent navigation and heavy weather as a peril of the seas are 
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the two defences with the most concerns in respect of uniformity. The defences and 
their concerns have been discussed at length in this study. 
As discussed in this study, all three of the defences are unique and complex in 
nature, and have varied legal and commercial implications for carrier, cargo- 
interests and insurers in the maritime industry. In ascertaining the merits and flaws of 
these defences taken by the various maritime jurisdictions, there is a need for the 
modernisation of the current carriage of by sea regime, in order to keep up with the 
demands of modern maritime transportation. The burgeoning growth in maritime 
trade, over the last century, demands for clear and modernised rules to be 
implemented in order to effectively regulate the carriage of goods by sea and further 
facilitate international trade.  
It must noted that these defences are still relevant in modern maritime trade, as acts 
of negligent navigation; fires at sea and heavy weather as a peril of the seas, are 
constant risks borne by the carrier in a sea carriage contract. These defences are 
entrenched in maritime law, through common law and codification in international 
conventions as well as the enactment of domestic legislation, suggesting that these 
exceptions will remain available to a carrier.  
A level of uniformity in the interpretation and application of the laws regulating the 
commonly invoked maritime defences discussed in this study, will lead to greater 
legal certainty and reduction of legal costs for all parties involved in sea carriage 
contracts. This requires the revision and modernisation of the carriage regimes 
regulating the carriage of goods by sea. It is submitted that this will lead to the 
development of these laws and achieving a better balance between the interests of 
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